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Abstract
In this thesis, I develop an analysis of the industry concentration seen in digital
markets today. I begin with a description and argument for the use of institutional
economics. This framework allows for the integration of an interdisciplinary approach
to economics. My analysis details the socioeconomic and political impacts, as well as
the underlying market dynamics that have pushed digital markets towards concentration. I offer novel explanations for the lack of firm behavior that should theoretically
increase profit, the existence of barriers to competition, and consumer behavior that
focus on the role of social institutions. I also detail many of the social costs of these
concentrated markets, such as their impact on democracy, power to influence social
institutions, and the impact they have on concentration in other markets. This is done
to show that the fears surrounding monopolies do not end with prices. Even in digital
markets, where many times prices are very low, if not zero, there are reasons that
monopoly is economically inefficient and socially sub-optimal. However, due to the
path-dependent nature of the extreme benefits associated with digital markets, policymakers cannot reasonably propose breaking up these companies. Instead, they must
use the power of the government to counteract the conglomerations of social power
seen in these private companies in search of an optimal outcome.
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Introduction
On January 6th , 2021 the world witnessed an action unseen in over 200 years: an as-

sault and invasion of the United States Capitol building. In the aftermath, Facebook (now
named Meta), Google, Amazon, and other major digital sites made the controversial move
to ban President Donald Trump from their platforms. Some sites deemed that the actions
of the President and his supporters had violated the terms and conditions of their sites,
while others appear to have followed a social trend rather than stating a specific violation.
Other companies, such as Apple, although not taking direct action, staunchly denounced the
behavior of those involved in the incursion at the Capitol (Leswing 2021).
In the aftermath of these actions taken by private companies, and the resulting impact on
social discourse, many began to worry about the immense power these technology companies
wield. Interestingly, the January 6th incident seemed to unite both sides of the political aisle
around a common enemy: Big Tech. Conservatives were incensed that these companies
held the power to censor dissenting views, especially since they view these companies as
overly liberal. Combining this with the high rates of lobbying done by these companies (in
particular Meta, Google, and Amazon), one can readily see why conservatives worry that
their voices are being censored by government censoring outsourced to private companies.
On the other hand, liberals worry that the unifying ability of social media and the internet
as a whole, originally viewed as a social benefit, could be used to great social detriment
without proper oversight. Moreover, liberals worry, perhaps similarly to conservatives, that
private oversight of these platforms would be inadequate, as well as grant too much power
to the executives of these platforms.
However, this fear regarding digital markets is not new. At the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, both sides of the political aisle criticized digital companies, especially
social media sites such as Meta and search engines such as Google, either for censoring information regarding alternative treatments (conservatives) or not vetting false results enough
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(liberals). Even before 2020, there was a palpable social backlash against the power of these
companies. A detailed list of antitrust cases and associated actions is beyond the scope of
this thesis, but a brief description of the trend will show the history of social fear on this
topic. Although the US before 2020 had taken zero major antitrust cases against the “Big
Four”,1 the European Union’s antitrust enforcement agency has taken numerous cases. As of
this writing, many of these cases are still under investigation, but the EU has already fined
Google nearly $10 billion for abusing its market power in search, mobile operating systems,
and digital advertising dominance.2
One of the main worries that has arisen as digital markets become more socially prevalent
is the rise of so-called “fake news” and false information being spread on Google and social
media sites such as those owned by Meta. This fear reminds many of the early 20th century
and the rise of “yellow journalism”. Yellow journalism was false or little researched articles
used for the sake of driving up sales of newspapers. These articles often relied on scare tactics
as well as sensationalized stories and headlines to entice more purchases of newspapers. Delos Wilcox (1900), a contemporary expert on municipal government and a former newspaper
editor, showed empirically that this tactic worked as journals deemed “yellow” had significantly higher sales. However, unlike what we see today, there did not appear to be a major
political alignment in the journals deemed “yellow”. That is to say, those newspapers engaging in sensational or false reporting and yellow journalism were less likely to discuss politics.
Thus, yellow journalism’s impact on the political and, by extension, economic, sphere was
limited. Even if it did have political impacts, these impacts did not have the partisan flavor
seen today. Therefore, yellow journalism did not have the same impact on the greater social
fabric. On the other hand, the focus of fake news, purportedly misleading information, and
censorship of information, whether misleading or true, on the internet has tended to relate
to political topics. Whether it be conspiracies regarding Barack Obama’s birthplace, Hillary
Clinton’s “email” scandal, or the infamous “Pizzagate” scandal, many of the most prevalent
1. The “Big Four” refers to Google/Alphabet, Meta/Facebook, Apple, and Amazon.
2. See this link for more information and updates regarding the ongoing cases
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and impactful aspects of alleged fake news have been expressly political. Thus, although
understanding the role of market power and industrial organization in newspaper markets
that led to yellow journalism is important, it does not suffice to explain the issues associated
with digital markets.
Moreover, digital markets have impacts beyond those associated directly with fake news.
Although the actions of many digital companies after the January 6th incident were nominally
due to the actions of those involved, it illuminated just how powerful these companies had
become. They had grown to wield the social power to effectively silence the President of the
United States online. Whether or not this action was warranted it raises major social worries,
not the least of which is the potential for private companies to surpass states in social power.
On the one hand, there is a major economic impact from the concentration seen in some of
these markets that warrants a detailed investigation. On the other hand, there are important
sociological, ethical, and moral impacts as well that must be investigated. Although there is
extensive interest in both of these fields independently, there is limited, if any, scholarship
that seeks to combine these impacts into a single cohesive analysis of digital markets’ impact
on the socio-economic behaviors of individuals. That is the goal of this thesis.
In particular, I argue in this thesis that economists take too narrow a focus when analyzing
digital markets for antitrust action. Through a broader analysis, economics can better
understand how these markets interact with society. Although it is a theoretically useful
project to focus narrowly on the economic impacts (as I detail in Section 4), when theory
is applied to the real world it must expand its focus. On the other hand, the extensive
sociological and ethical writings on these markets lack the economic theory that can help
understand the impacts of policies. By combining these two related, but currently disjoint
scholarly communities, an analysis will be more robust and better understand the true welfare
implications of these markets.
It may seem on the surface that this approach requires a complete rethinking of what
economic analysis entails and therefore a new framework for economics, but it is encapsu-
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lated in the uniquely American school of institutional economics, a school including the likes
of Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, and John Kenneth Galbraith. This school criticized what it viewed as the overly deterministic economic theory of the classical (and later
neoclassical) economists. Neoclassical and classical economic theory, according to these
economists, had too limited a definition of market power, focusing narrowly on economic
power instead of incorporating political and social power that can change economic structures. However, in the predominantly industrial and tangible economy of the first half of
the 20th century, most neoclassical theory was well equipped to analyze the markets as they
existed, pushing institutional approaches to the periphery of the economics profession. Eventually, however in the second half of the 20th century, some economists, such as Douglass
North, Oliver Williamson, and Ronald Coase began to incorporate institutionalist thought
within the rational actor framework of neoclassical economics, leading to the development
of “new” institutional economics.
However, neither “new” institutional economics nor neoclassical economics can fully grasp
the societal influence and power that digital markets have today. Unlike the past, where companies had physical size limitations due to location or information transmission, the rise of
the digital economy has led to the dissolution of these former limitations. Companies such
as Apple, Amazon, Meta, and Alphabet have shown the ability to grow to immense size
extremely quickly. This growth has an important secondary impact that a solely economic
analysis fails to account for: in digital markets, economic power can translate to informational power. Moreover, this informational power redounds to further concentration of
economic, social, and political power. When economic power impacts how and what information is shared, neoclassical results can diverge from reality much more than in tangible
economies. Neoclassical economic theory is therefore unsuited for the analysis of the effect
of market concentration in the modern digital world, where information has become a commodity. Instead an institutionalist approach, which investigates the interactions within a
market, is better suited for the analysis of today’s digital markets.
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This more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the impacts of digital markets is
not just a theoretical exercise showing the efficacy and validity of institutional economics as
an analytical framework. Without having a detailed — and more importantly, accurate —
analysis of digital markets, antitrust agencies cannot be expected to optimally take action.
By incorporating non-economic analyses as well as economic ones, antitrust agencies will
have a greater understanding regarding the true social impact of any potential actions.
Understanding the true social impacts of actions can allow these agencies to no longer remain
beholden to the economic orthodoxy of antitrust action such as breaking up big firms. It may
very well be that in our new complex digital economy, regulation of major firms is Pareto
superior to breaking these firms up.
Apprehensions are growing on both sides of the political aisle about what they see as a
common threat: the power of Big Tech. The political right claims they have been unjustly
censored since these companies are run mostly by Democrat-supporting CEOs, while the
political left argues that the size of these companies allows them to manipulate political outcomes. Mainstream economic theory has a limited approach to this question, typically using
market share as a proxy for market power. However, without understanding both the interactions between consumers and firms as well as the interactions between firms and society,
an understanding of market power will always be incomplete. For Big Tech, in particular,
mainstream economic theory is unable to fully explain the winner-take-all nature of the market and its social implications. These markets are not like natural monopolies, where it is
just inefficient to have multiple producers of the same good due to declining average costs.
They may still see declining average costs but, more importantly, the network externalities
make these goods more valuable the more numerous are the other users of the good. Furthermore, mainstream theory typically focuses its analysis on the direct economic impacts of
monopoly, leaving the elaboration of more nuanced social costs to other fields of study. It is
true that economists since Coase (1960) have formally discussed social costs in an economic
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context,3 though these have relied heavily on social costs that have an explicitly economic
cost. Coase’s famous example involved a rancher’s cattle harming a farmer’s farmland, which
can be seen to have direct economic costs as either the farmer saw decreased output of their
farmland or the rancher saw lesser cattle production. However, Coase’s discussion of social
costs overlooks social issues such as free speech, democracy, and unjust power dynamics.
Although these are harder to classify and delineate than classical views of social cost, they
nonetheless deserve investigation. I argue in this thesis that economists should more closely
investigate the social costs of monopolization because ignoring them ignores important indirect economic impacts. Furthermore, these social impacts should influence the policies used
to alleviate the threat of monopoly.

2

Institutional Economics as an Analytical Framework
Mainstream economics, often called “neoclassical economics”, is the typical approach of

economists in our modern times. This approach analyzes markets through the assumptions
of firms and consumers which optimize either profits or utility. With these assumptions,
mainstream economists mathematically model the behavior of economic actors and solve for
variables of interest. There are a myriad of adjustments and updates to the assumptions,
utility functions, and interactions across markets, depending on the particular problem under
investigation. Through incorporating these adjustments, neoclassical economics has been applied all over the world to all sorts of economic questions, often with much success. However,
many of these theories rely heavily on the state of the world that existed at the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution. In that world, information was slow-moving, advertising was
limited, and decisions were made between needs rather than solely wants. As John Kenneth
Galbraith showed in The New Industrial State and his earlier work The Affluent Society,
the world in the middle of the 20th century was already vastly different than the world from
which Adam Smith’s theory of the “invisible hand” arose. In this new world, as described
3. There were also many early economists who discussed social costs, such as Arthur Pigou.
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by Galbraith, companies had the social power to influence consumer preferences, and individuals in industrialized nations seldom worried about necessities. These differences caused
theoretical complications for the ideas of early economists. Just as Galbraith showed that
the rise of major corporations was an epochal shift, our current trend towards digital markets
and goods, in contrast to physical ones, represents another epochal shift. Although neoclassical economics can adjust its theories, the reliance on the assumption of exogenous social
factors in its analysis limits its applicability to the world Galbraith described, which has ever
changing social norms. It is possible to develop a model within neoclassical economics which
takes economic actions such as savings rates, marginal propensities to consume, and other
socially determined behaviors as endogenous, but the major issue that arises for neoclassical
economics in modern times is the power of companies to make preferences endogenous. If
preferences are endogenous, a determination of a consistent utility function that consumers
maximize is fraught with difficulties and perhaps impossible. Thus, mainstream economics
is not the ideal analytical framework for market analysis in today’s world.
A common criticism of mainstream economics is that it is detached from reality since
many of its assumptions (e.g., rationality and optimization of straightforward objective functions) ring false to the average observer. Although it is true that these assumptions greatly
simplify the use of mathematical models, they blind economists to important questions that
are assumed away.4 One example is the question: “what are the costs of social media?”
An economist using neoclassical assumptions might approach this question by attempting to
determine how people view the costs through their behavior in the market. This approach
implicitly assumes that behavior in the market is directly reflecting the costs associated
with a good. But how does this economist handle the issue of a good with no nominal
price? Moreover, how does this economist grapple with the fact that social media is so ubiquitous today that everything from music to news, and even jobs are found through social
media? These digital markets pose unique problems for the use of neoclassical assumptions
4. To be fair, recent developments in mainstream economics, especially behavioral economics, have led to
a relaxation of these assumptions. However, I believe the general aspect is still true.
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required in many mainstream economic analyses. While these problems are hard for neoclassical economics to surmount, other traditions in economic analysis, particularly institutional
economics, are more promising. Particularly, institutional economics has approached these
questions directly for over a century and has developed a useful set of methods in support of
these analyses. I thus argue that an analysis of Big Tech companies, and digital markets more
generally, is best done through the framework of institutional economics, particularly “old”
institutional economics. This approach not only draws from accepted economic theory, but
also leverages the many developments in related subjects (e.g., sociology and philosophy).
This approach better explains the economic impacts and trends in a market, which allows
for a more detailed and complete economic analysis than most mainstream approaches.
2.1

What is an Institution?
The approach of institutional economics is distinct from that of classical and neoclassical

economics, especially concerning its unit of observation. Unlike the classical focus on units
of production, institutional economics focuses instead on the base social unit of an “institution”. These institutions are the entry point for this analysis because social interactions are
determined by individuals interacting with institutions. Thus, by understanding the institutions, we can better understand how individuals behave and, by extension, how the market
behaves. However, a common criticism of institutional economics is the ambiguity in the
definition of an institution. One of the main founders of institutional thought, John R. Commons, described them as “collective action in control, liberation and expansion of individual
action,” (Commons 1931, 649) choosing to focus on their interaction with the individual,
while more recently Geoffrey Hodgson5 defined an institution as “systems of established and
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions,” instead focusing on the general impact on social interactions (Hodgson 2006, 2). Both definitions, however, reflect a consistent
aspect: institutions are society-level rules, customs, or conventions that impact individuals
5. Hodgson is an editor of the Journal of Institutional Economics as of the writing of this thesis.
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and mold their social interactions within that society.
To illustrate this definition further, some examples of institutions in society today may
be of assistance. One major institution that we have in our society is the profit motive. This
is an institution since it is a society-level convention that influences how individuals engage
in economic transactions. In particular, it structures individual actions around maximizing
profits over other motives (see Polanyi ([1944]2001) and Graeber (2011) for evidence of other
motives for individual action). The aforementioned definition also shows that all laws – at
least, binding laws – give rise to institutions, because they are manifest in rules and shape
customs that impact individuals and structure their social interactions. As a final point on
the definitions of institutions, it should be noted that an institution has no inherent moral
value. In other words, it is not inherently good or bad to be an institution.
2.2

The History of Institutional Economics
The development of institutional economics in America at the end of the 19th and begin-

ning of the 20th century coincided with major changes in American society. The push west
had reached the Pacific, a radical reconstruction of American society had been attempted
in the rubble of the Civil War, and America was becoming a major world economic power.
At the same time, America was seeing the rise of major concentrations of wealth and power,
both individually and in corporations. Moreover, the philosophy of pragmatism, led by John
Dewey and William James, was blossoming at this time. One major argument of this school
of thought, perhaps best encapsulated in Dewey’s theory of instrumentalism, was that scientific theories cannot ever truly mirror reality, but instead scientific progress arises through
a development of better prediction and explanation of the world.
Influenced heavily by Dewey, Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons began to investigate the institutions that influence economic interactions. Veblen was a student of the
economist James Laurence Laughlin at Cornell and later, after receiving his doctorate in philosophy from Yale, was a professor at the University of Chicago and Stanford, as well as part
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of the founding core of the New School for Social Research. Commons, on the other hand,
although he never received his doctorate, did graduate study for two years under Richard T.
Ely at Johns Hopkins, and taught first at Syracuse (where he was dismissed for being a radical Georgist) and later at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (which soon became a hub for
institutional economists). Veblen famously detailed the theories of “conspicuous consumption” and “conspicuous leisure” where individuals consume goods and services, or substitute
leisure for work, largely for the purpose of showing others that they can afford these luxuries,
even at the risk of going into debt. In Commons’ words, institutional economics is different
from the prior European economics because “the classic and hedonic economists, with their
communistic and anarchistic offshoots, founded their theories on the relation of man to nature, but institutionalism is a relation of man to man” (Commons 1931, 652). Since these
European economists focused on the commodities produced by labor, Commons argues they
inevitably concluded that a “materialistic metaphor of the automatic equilibrium” would
arise (Commons 1931, 652). Instead, institutionalists investigate the transaction, leading
them not to an idealist theory of equilibrium, but rather an understanding of the three basic
types of interrelated transactions: bargaining, managerial, and rationing (Commons 1931).6
Commons further details why institutionalism uses Dewey’s ideas on psychology, saying “institutional economics is behavioristic and the behavior in question is none other than the
behavior of individuals while participating in transactions”. Dewey’s psychology was used
as “only Dewey’s is socialistic,” a requisite quality for institutional economics due to the
explicitly social character of transactions (Commons 1931, 655).7
This social approach to psychology leads to another of the major distinctions for institutional economics when compared to the mainstream: institutionalists argue that preferences
6. Bargaining transactions are those most commonly thought of in markets. They are the transactions
that take place between buyer and seller. Managerial transactions are those that are based on individuallevel power dynamics, such as employee and employer. Lastly, rationing transactions are those that rely on
society-level power dynamics, such as state decrees like taxes.
7. Thus institutional economists, rather than, say, Kahneman and Tversky, may be seen as the first
behavioral economists. Nevertheless, it is true that most early institutionalists used psychology that lacked
the empirics the Kahneman and Tversky had.
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are endogenous. This endogeneity of preferences derives from the institutionalist view that
“the individual is both a producer and product of her circumstances” (Hodgson 1998, 177).
Since individuals are constantly interacting with institutions, their preferences are constantly
molded by prevalent social norms. However, individuals’ preferences can, in turn, shape social norms. For this reason, institutionalists, unlike mainstream economists, do not assume
that one direction of impact is more prevalent or powerful, instead they seek to understand
interactions through a detailed analysis of the omnidirectional causality at play in social
relations.
The original school of institutionalism founded by Veblen and his disciples was an expressly interdisciplinary practice of economics, openly taking developments in physical sciences like biology, social sciences like anthropology, psychology, and sociology, and humanities like philosophy to further its understanding of transactions. This interdisciplinary approach derives directly from Dewey’s influence on the institutionalists, as it offers a scientific
approach to the economic sphere which has greater explanatory power. However, this also
means that institutionalism is more an approach to economic analysis, rather than a theory
that is expected to describe markets and transactions that have not been directly investigated. Therefore, unlike mainstream economics, whenever a new market is investigated, the
institutions involved in that specific market must be investigated. By extension, institutionalists believe no theory can be developed that can explain the entire economy since each
market is unique. Therefore, a detailed institutional analysis, such as the one that follows
in this thesis, is necessary to expand the understanding of the dynamics of a novel market.
The lack of a consistent theory of economic behavior in “old” institutional economics
has led some “new” institutionalists to deem their earlier intellectual progenitors “antitheoretical” (Coase 1998; Posner 1993).8 This is a valid critique as it is true that “old”
8. The modifier “old” is solely to differentiate the foundation dates, as many institutionalists today still
identify with the “old” school, such as Geoffrey Hodgson and Ha-Joon Chang. In this thesis, I will use
“old institutionalism” to describe the approach to institutionalism used by Commons, Veblen, Hodgson, and
other earlier writers, while “new institutionalism” will be used to describe the school of thought started by
Ronald Coase and Richard Posner.
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institutionalists do not believe that theory should claim to explain the entire economy and
its corresponding interactions since the underlying institutions are always changing. Thus, to
allow economics to be continuously relevant, old institutionalists seek an explanation of the
economy that recognizes it is dynamic and evolving, instead of relying on static assumptions
(Hodgson 1998). On the other hand, new institutionalists such as Oliver Williamson argue
that their theory does not seek to reformulate economic theory as a whole, but to explain the
development of institutions (Williamson 2000). Douglass North explicitly states that “the
new institutional economics builds on, modifies, and extends neo-classical theory” in order
to accommodate institutional impacts (North 1995, 17). In particular, this is done because
institutions become important with positive transaction costs, since “the neo-classical result
only obtains when it is costless to transact” (North 1995, 18). This deviation back towards
neoclassical theory allowed new institutionalism to gain mainstream acceptance, but removed
from it much of the true institutionalist nature, at least in the original sense of the word
(Hodgson 1998). This is because institutionalists of the Veblenian school seek not only to
explain how institutions arise and develop, but also how these social interactions influence
economic outcomes and how they can influence consumer preferences over time. Thus, in
an attempt to more broadly analyze and offer an oft ignored economic analysis of digital
market concentration, I will be using the approach of old institutionalist economics in this
thesis.
Although it is true my use of old institutional economics sets up a criticism of the resulting analysis as “anti-theoretical”, I will not only bolster the analysis through institutionalist
commentaries, but also by showing how this institutional approach allows for a deeper understanding than mainstream economic theory alone in modern, ever-changing markets. That
being said, I will not be excluding new institutionalist analyses from my study, instead using
their approach and conclusions as an addendum to the explicitly interdisciplinary approach
of old institutionalism.
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2.3

The Approach of Institutional Economics
Since a major aspect of this analysis entails the investigation of digital markets and their

corresponding institutions, it will be useful to preemptively describe the approach this thesis
uses. Following Hodgson (1998) I am chiefly concerned with the “institutions, habits, rules,”
associated with digital markets and their related development. Specifically, I investigate how
the institutions associated with these markets are intimately connected with general societal
habits and rules. I then develop an analysis of the social impacts of these institutions.
Scattered throughout this analysis are insights from political science, sociology, and other
related social sciences, to further the understanding of the transactions taking place in digital
markets. I also include a discussion of how the actions of economic actors in these markets
can influence the institutions at play.
Furthermore, this thesis analyzes policy implications with the underlying institutions as
well as offering potential policy remedies, for which I draw heavily from the approach of
Harry Trebing (1987). Trebing dictates two opposing forms of regulation: neoclassical and
institutionalist. Since I will be arguing from an institutionalist standpoint, I will use the
typical nuanced institutionalist stance: competition is neither fully beneficial nor destructive.
Thus, it may be useful to attempt to develop a middle road which allows competition to the
extent that society can benefit, while limiting the negative side effects. I do not expect to
fully develop this middle road in this thesis, but since any institutionalist regulation requires
extensive knowledge of the market to be regulated, I hope to expand the knowledge of the
institutions at play in digital markets. With expanded knowledge of these markets, future
researchers can develop theories and models which can help to design regulation in these
industries that are socially optimal.
Lastly, since much of institutional economics was developed in the Progressive Era
through the first decades after World War II (late 19th century to the mid 20th century),
it is necessary in this discussion on the approach of the thesis to discuss how institutional
economics can be updated to the 21st century. Almeida and Mortari (2021) show how the
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rise of technology and vast amounts of information and interactions at people’s fingertips
requires a rethinking of how decisions are made. This rethinking requires the analyst to
both understand the institutions influencing society, as well as use a realistic, in contrast to
idealist, approach to the impact of said institutions. A realistic approach necessarily holds
that the adjustment of institutions, habits, and social rules do not change immediately, but
that “adaptation takes time” (ibid, 342). For example, Almedia and Mortari point out that
typical analyses of the negative impacts of smartphones tend to place the blame on the existence of these smartphones. However, they rightly point out “it is not a terrible thing to
have a computer called ‘smartphone’,” but rather the terrible thing is how the institutions
we have interact with these new technologies (ibid, 344). Since the institutionalist approach
views institutions as impacting individual action as well as impacted by individual action,
it can be seen why these institutions are the issue, and thus the object of investigation in
this thesis. If our institutions are evolving slower than the technology we use, our interactions are being influenced by institutional structures which developed in a vastly different
economic and social world. Thus, these behaviors, which may have been optimal in previous
situations, should not be expected to still result in optimal decision making.
A telling example might be the cliché parental rejoinder to their child playing on a
computer: “back in my day we used to play outside” or “kids these days only play video
games”. Although this might be seen as parents attempting to show their children the fault in
their ways, an institutionalist might instead say that this response is an institution that has
been slow to evolve to the modern world. Our modern world has video games and in many
instances children have the ability now to interact over vastly greater distances than they
ever could before. This ability allows children to gain a worldly knowledge at a much younger
age than ever before. Furthermore, children who engage with technology at a young age may
be better able to use these tools in beneficial ways (Gottschalk 2019). At the same time, it
is true that digital communication is not easily compared to the in-person communication
of “playing outside,” though there is some evidence that digital communication can assist in
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the development of children’s social skills (Winther 2017). All in all, this example shows that
institutions develop over time and thus cannot be expected to adjust to changing economic
and social dynamics immediately. The inability of institutions to change instantaneously
will necessarily lead to frictions and negative outcomes. These frictions are a novel part of
this analysis when compared to the mainstream approach, which ignores the influence of
past thought on present action.
Another update needed for the 21st century is an understanding of how prevalent and
pervasive institutions are in society today. With the expansion of technology, and thus
society, into almost every sphere of life, institutions associated with digital markets are
influencing more people than ever before. In the past, there were physical spaces, such as
a mall, public park, or civic event that reinvigorated and reconstituted institutions. These
spaces allowed institutions to have less direct contact with individuals, which thus meant
these institutions were more susceptible to change. As mentioned above, institutionalists
believe that individuals interact with, are influenced by, and reconstitute the institutions
in society. An extension of this is that as institutions have more social prevalence, they
become viewed as more powerful social rules, stifling their ability to change. However, the
institutionalist approach recognizes that this social prevalence also pits the individuals in
society against these institutions. Thus, growth of an institution’s social prevalence can also
lead to prompt institutional evolution if there is adequate social support.
2.4

Institutional Economics and Antitrust
An institutional analysis of digital market concentration benefits from its nuanced ap-

proach to the issue of competition in comparison to mainstream economics. This nuance is
critical for the analysis of a market that has brought so many socially beneficial products
to consumers including internet search algorithms, smartphones, access to shopping at the
touch of a button and social networks that connect us to our friends, both near and far.
Monopoly and the study of competition was one of the major intellectual discussions tak-
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ing place during the Progressive Era. During that time, America experienced the rise of
major railroad monopolies, concentration in the financial sector, and the infamous power of
Standard Oil and John D. Rockefeller. Those of the neoclassical school believed that these
concentrations of economic power were due to exogenous or transitory factors. Conversely,
institutionalists viewed these “market failures” as caused by institutional interactions and
scale economies from the organization of the market. Using this approach, institutionalist economists developed economic rationale for antitrust laws in the beginning of the 20th
century, as well as developing their own unique competition theory.
The institutionalist approach, in typical fashion, takes a historical approach to the question of competition. More specifically, it seeks to understand how markets change over their
lifespan. Typical neoclassical views on monopoly and market power are that they are aberrations, with perfect competition being the normal outcome. Some, like the Chicago School,
argued that monopoly and market power were short-term, implying antitrust action would
necessarily decrease economic efficiency (Trebing 1987). However, like many aspects of institutionalist economics, institutionalists tend to regard the view of a “normal outcome” as
problematic. They see the rise of market power, which Oliver Williamson calls “dominant
firm outcomes,” as the result of the failure of internal policing mechanisms in markets, on
top of the neoclassical explanations of natural monopolies, patents, and scale economies
(Williamson 1975, 208). These failures can be the result of first-mover advantages (where
the earlier entrants in a market have lower average costs than later entrants thus allowing
greater profits for the former group), ineptitude of competitors, or some exogenous shock
that impacts only one member. The existence of these dominant firms can cause economic
issues that a government might seek to alleviate, such as allocative inefficiency and the
potential for economic power to evolve into political or social power (Williamson 1975).
Competition theory and its application to antitrust law must also investigate the question
of what constitutes extreme market power of the sort requiring action from the government.
The institutionalist approach to this question is to analyze the underlying market trends
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and decide whether there was a reasonable case for antitrust action. Through this approach
Williamson argued that in static markets it might be necessary to allow mergers so that efficiency can increase. Beyond just efficiency, innovation may be negatively impacted by lack of
competition associated with market power (Williamson 1968). As Joseph Schumpeter argued
in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, the fostering of competition might allow
for creative destruction in the market for innovation techniques, driving out old techniques
thereby opening up space for new innovation. However, with enough market power, a firm
could mitigate this, giving greater power to the intrafirm institutions and habits determining research approach and topics. An institutionalist approach must necessarily take these
considerations into account when determining the costs of market power and the benefits of
enforcement of antitrust laws.
For competition theory to expand beyond solely an academic theory and gain policymaking power, institutionalists must determine a program of goals for antitrust action and
help develop actions based on the individual situation at hand (including market structure,
law, and other major institutions involved). Trebing (1987) argued that antitrust actions
should seek to increase efficiency and choice, as well as understand that to be successful
they must have the support of the public. Trebing also argued the form of antitrust was
likely to change over time with the changing of institutions and public sentiment. Increasing
competition through direct antitrust action may also be a way that governments can enact
changes to institutions as compared to blanket laws. Williamson (1975) points out that it is
possible a powerful institution will seek to dodge antitrust laws if there is no active power
counteracting this incentive. Thus, there exists an argument in support of antitrust which
uses the threat of action (which must have substance else it turn into a charade), as a way
to disincentivize anti-competitive behavior in markets.
Institutionalists have, like in many instances, a nuanced approach to the question of competition and market power. Regardless of the specific arguments for when antitrust action
is necessary, institutionalists agree that the neoclassical approach of assuming competition
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will always yield optimal outcomes (unless there was an exogenous reasoning for its failure)
is naı̈ve. Understanding that competition in our modern complex economy can lead to market power without specific anti-competitive behavior is an important, yet underdeveloped,
avenue of thought in economics. Mainstream economists tend to take a deterministic approach to the world, that is, if a firm succeeds there must be an economic reason why they
succeeded over other firms. However, institutional economists and their theories on competition and antitrust argue that luck and timing are just as important to the outcome of
economic processes. An understanding of all of these factors allows for both more complete
economic understandings of the issues around market power, as well as a delineation of the
ethical question of antitrust. Specifically, if luck is the reason one firm (and by extension
those working for that firm) succeeded while another failed, do the same ethical questions
around disincentivizing “success” remain? Are antitrust actions more reasonable and more
economically necessary in these instances to preserve a reality of meritocracy?
The school of new institutionalism, and its approach to the study of law and economics,
has developed a vastly different view of the role of antitrust policy. Although it is not an
approach I will use, it is nonetheless influential, with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ), and many mainstream economists using it
in analysis of market power and potential remedies. The study of law and economics is not
unique to new institutional economics, with John R. Common’s 1924 book Legal Foundations
of Capitalism viewed as the first detailed investigation of the relationship between laws and
economic activity. Nonetheless, new institutional economists have become some of the most
well-known scholars of law and economics and, by extension, antitrust law.
Law and economics is often described as a school similar to that of the Second Chicago
School, with many figures, such as Richard Posner, Ronald Coase, and George Stigler, in
this newer Chicago School bringing major developments to law and economics as well. Due
to this, the approach of law and economics to antitrust (and law more generally) was that
“economic efficiency was the exclusive purpose of...enforcement” (Bougette, Deschamps, and
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Marty 2015, 315). The approach of law and economics is in stark contrast to the viewpoint
of old institutionalist economists who saw economic stability, fair distribution of wealth,
and preservation of future competition, along with its beneficial social and political effects,
as other equally important purposes for enforcement (Panhans and Schumacher 2021). In
further contrast to the institutionalist school of thought, scholars of law and economics such
as Coase and Frank Knight expressly limited the scope of what economics should be about.
Institutionalists’ main distinguishing factor was their focus on social interactions and how
those interactions caused impacts to the economy (which was not solely the market). This
necessarily brought institutionalists to ask ethical questions such as “what is fair?”, “should
the government seek the common good even at the detriment of the private individual?” and
more. In contrast, Knight said that although social justice was a useful goal to have, it was
a loose category that was nearly impossible to use as a basis for policy (Hackney 1997).
Exploring the development of antitrust law illuminates a social interaction that may
be prevalent in the modern discussion of Big Tech and antitrust action against it. One of
the most interesting aspects of the development of American antitrust law is that the first
lobbying for antitrust action was not from worried consumers, but rather competitors who
worried that a large company in their market would cause them to lose profits (Bougette,
Deschamps, and Marty 2015). This tendency highlights an intriguing institution: market
self-regulation may be a bigger impetus for regulation than consumer advocacy. It is possible
this behavior results from consumer purchasing habits which make them functionally blind
to threats to their welfare. For instance, it is true that in the case of Standard Oil, like
Amazon today, prices decreased while output increased. Thus, in a strictly theoretical nature
consumer welfare has gone up. However, this greater market power might make future threats
to consumer welfare more worrisome as there will be fewer options if the market becomes
monopolized.
The field of “law and economics” developed to integrate economics into the practice of
law, in an attempt to make law as scientific as possible, thereby relying on judicial discretion
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less. This was the goal of this movement and on that goal, they appear to have succeeded.
However, from an institutional perspective, law and economics has veered away from its
institutional roots. When understanding the issues at play in a market, ignoring moral and
ethical questions can be beneficial to determine a baseline understanding of the theoretical
results. However, this omission limits the application to producing new laws, and instead
limits law and economics to determining how to act under existing laws. This description of
the development of antitrust laws shows that the school of law and economics would not have
been able to develop these laws by itself and required these laws for its analysis to exist. That
is to say, although law and economics and other developments from new institutionalism are
useful, they are only useful for analyzing existing legal structures, but fail to account for the
ethical and moral questions that are required when designing new laws.
2.5

Summary of Section
• An institution is a society-level rule, custom, or convention that impacts individuals
and molds their social interactions within society.
• Institutional economics focuses on the market transaction, rather than the production
of goods as mainstream economics does. In markets, such as digital markets, with
anomalous production traits, this focus on transactions allows for broad understanding
without theoretical confusion caused by low or zero marginal costs.
• Old institutional economists view the goals of antitrust more broadly than mainstream
economists. These goals include social harmony, support of democratic rights, promotion of meritocratic ideals, among others. This is a beneficial trait when investigating
a market which has become so socially impactful.
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3

Digital Markets Today
Digital markets, just as the technology that has spawned them, are a new phenomenon

in the history of economics. For centuries the predominant input in the production of
most goods traded in markets was labor, or, as Adam Smith wrote in 1776, “... toil and
trouble” (Adam Smith [1776]1994). Alfred Marshall sought to formalize this understanding
when he used William Stanley Jevons’ utility theory to expand his own supply and demand
analysis of market equilibrium. This expansion sparked the marginalist revolution which
inaugurated the extensive use of mathematics in economic theory. Paul Sameulson expanded
further the marginalists’ developments, relying on the assumptions that the chosen position
of an economic actor (i.e., the equilibrium) was the maximization of utility and that these
equilibria were stable to formulate his general equilibrium theory (Backhouse 2004, 258–259).
These theories were helpful even as the industrialized world saw drastic changes during the
20th century, such as the move from a predominantly industrial economy towards a service
economy. However, today we have seen yet another change that ultimately threatens the
applicability of these theories: the rise of digital markets. These markets are unique as they
have low, if not zero marginal costs, and high upfront costs. This has led to concentration
levels that have scarcely been seen in modern history. Many view this rising characteristic of
concentration with fear. This fear of concentrated markets is further exacerbated due to the
personal data held by many of these firms. In order to give a complete understanding of the
market under investigation and the current trends, I will detail empirically the development
of four of the largest companies associated with digital markets: Facebook (now known as
Meta), Google, Amazon, and Apple.
3.1

Facebook/Meta
From a small social network website to rate student attractiveness on Harvard’s campus

called “thefacebook.com” in 2004, to the largest family of social networking sites in the world
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with 3.59 billion unique active monthly users (nearly 46% of the world population),9 Meta
Platforms, formerly known solely as Facebook, has become a globally recognized economic
force (Meta Platforms Inc. 2021, 50). Beyond the extreme market share that Meta’s portfolio
of companies take up in social networking,10 the vast size of these platforms has led to an
economic dependency the likes of which has scarcely been seen in history. As a 2015 Wall
Street Journal article put it, “anyone building a brand. . . can’t ignore Facebook’s highly
engaged daily audience of 1 billion” (Clark and McMillan 2015).11 Moreover, these billions
of users are on Meta-owned sites for nearly an hour every day (Statista, n.d.).12 Thus, it
is immediately obvious to any company that without advertising on Facebook — let alone
Meta’s other major social media platforms such as Instagram — there is a major market left
untapped. Thus, demand for advertisements on Facebook is highly inelastic.
This property of the demand for advertisements on Facebook can be best elucidated with
the example of the news industry. News agencies heavily depend on readership generated
from both Facebook ads and articles. So much so that when Facebook reorganized its
“News Feed” to focus on what it described as “meaningful connections,” some news sites saw
declines in readership of upwards 30% (Andersen 2017). For an industry that has historically
had extremely tight margins, this drastic decrease in ad revenue can be deadly. Thus, the
dependency on Facebook’s platform gives Meta and its subsidiaries immense economic power
in markets beyond their own. Moreover, Meta’s development of “Facebook News” has caused
competitors, such as MeWe’s founder Mark Weinstein, to fear “a truly problematic quid pro
quo,” since Facebook will be paying news agencies for their stories, which can influence the
stories these news agencies publish about Facebook (Weinstein 2021). With this power,
9. This is not excluding China’s population. However, since Meta has been banned in China since 2009,
it has closer to 55% of the population where its product is legal (author’s calculations).
10. Estimated at upwards of 95% of the “relevant product market” according to a report by the United
States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, with only
Twitter and Tumblr (and previously MySpace) as major competitors (United States House of Representatives
2020). An explanation of this relevant product market is given below.
11. As of Dec 31, 2021 the daily engagement on Facebook according to Meta is nearly 2 billion unique users
(Meta Platforms Inc. 2021)
12. Assuming these users get around 8 hours of sleep a night, this equates to roughly 6% of their waking
lives on Meta owned platforms.
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Facebook can influence the stories and information that half the world population view.
The inelastic demand for advertisements has led to Meta generating nearly $115 billion in
advertising revenue across its family of apps. This amounts to a staggering 99.5% of Meta’s
revenue from these apps and 97.5% of its total revenue (Meta Platforms Inc. 2021, 65).
These ads become even more powerful with the sheer quantity of user data that Meta gathers
from its platforms. With these data, Meta can offer targeted advertisements to businesses.
Leaked documents from 2017 detail how Facebook told advertisers it had conducted internal
research that showed it could determine the emotions of users, especially young users who
may be more easily swayed by advertising (Levin 2017). With this granular level data and
the ability to target users with pinpoint accuracy, Meta can offer advertisers the unique
ability to directly advertise to their ideal audience. Unlike in the past where advertisers had
general demographics about their audience, but could not narrowly reach their preferred
audience, with Facebook’s extensive user data, these companies can more efficiently spend
on advertising through using targeted advertisements.
The ability of Meta to leverage its extensive data is economically impactful not only
because it allows companies to spend on advertising more efficiently, but also, due to the
impact it may have on consumer preferences. These data can allow companies to generate
demand for their goods, rather than solely satisfy existing demand (Kirkpatrick 2010). Although it is true that marketing has always attempted to generate demand for products,
the ability to target advertisements to specific consumers further increases this ability. As
David Kirkpatrick puts it, “algorithms that orchestrate our ads are starting to orchestrate
our lives” leading to a question of whether consumers are truly the ones who prefer products, or if it is companies who prefer that consumers “prefer” these goods (Kirkpatrick 2010,
9–10).
Furthermore, as more and more users join and use Facebook and other Meta platforms,
the data that Meta can offer advertisers grows in quality and thus value. This can lock in
Meta’s position in the market since advertisers will prefer, all else equal, to advertise where
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they can generate the greatest impact for the same price. Other market competitors that
exist (such as Twitter or TikTok) or other potential competitors would be further hampered
by this lock-in effect13 due to the profit maximizing nature of the firms which are advertising. Increases in user base increase the quality of a platform’s data exponentially because
increasing the user base not only expands the data set, but also increases the connections and
interpolations among existing data, increasing its usefulness in advertising (Li, Nirei, and
Yamana 2019). Thus, even if a platform such as TikTok has roughly a quarter of the user
base of the combination of all Meta-owned entities (1 billion vs. 3.59 billion), the quality of
Meta’s data will be much more than four times that of TikTok’s (assuming both collect the
same amount of data per user). Companies are thus incentivized to advertise the most on
the platform with the greatest user base, not only because it has the greatest reach, but also
because it is the platform which has the most extensive data, and thus, the greatest ability
to offer the company efficient use of its advertising budget.14
The exponential increase in quality and power of data incentivizes Meta to attempt to
buy out other social media platforms, to capitalize on the growth of user data. This incentive,
when coupled with the revenue limitations on smaller platforms, means that larger companies
will receive more surplus through buying smaller companies. Since Meta has a much greater
user data pool, its valuation of the target company will be greater than the company values
itself, since that company has no access to the data Meta controls. Data is therefore being
systematically undervalued by smaller companies, a trend which can be capitalized on by
larger companies like Meta (Li, Nirei, and Yamana 2019). Meta thus has an opportunity to
purchase new revenue streams for less than their true value, growing profits and likely market
power as well. As this process continues in the market, it inevitably leads to concentration
13. A lock-in results when certain market characteristics lead to users having difficulty leaving a platform,
if not complete inability. Thus lock-in effects are those effects caused by the aspects of the market which
limit the switching of consumers. One of the most famous lock-in effects is the QWERTY keyboard. This
keyboard was designed to stop typewriters from jamming and so deliberately placed commonly used letters
far away. However, with computers this is no longer necessary, yet remains the standard keyboard.
14. This does not account for the fact that Meta’s strategy of allowing webpages to integrate Facebook
with their site, by allowing users to “like” the webpage, offers Meta even greater access to user data beyond
social media (Pariser 2011).
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and consolidation.
Although Meta sees significant benefits from the lock-in effects associated with its data
quality and breadth, other lock-in effects exist. Namely, the lock-in effects associated with
social networks is another major cause of market power, potentially an even bigger one
than that associated with data. Network effects are inherent to social media, which means
that platforms with greater user bases are more attractive to new users than similar ones
with smaller user bases as the main use of social media is connecting with friends and
like-minded individuals. All else equal, there is a higher likelihood of finding these groups
of people to connect with on a platform with a greater user base than one with smaller.
In the wording of network theory, new nodes (i.e., users) connect with higher probability to
existing nodes (i.e., platforms) with greater popularity (Barabasi 2014, 70–71). Furthermore,
since social media very rarely has been specialized for specific types of connections (beyond
maybe LinkedIn) there are limited, if any, alternatives with the same quality and quantity
of potential connections. Like the reasons given for the exponential increase in quality of
data for advertisers from greater network size, there is likely a large increase in the utility of
a greater network for users. Every subsequent user may not only be a direct connection for
an existing user, but also allow the existing user to find new connections or reconnect with
long lost friends.
Beyond just the lock-in associated with new users, large social media sites have a unique
retention quality due to the cohesive nature of their networks. Due to the high switching
costs (or in institutional economics parlance, transaction costs) associated with leaving a
social media site, when a site develops a large user base, it will be exceedingly difficult for
it to lose this user base. High switching costs arise because users leaving a large platform
sacrifice the utility of their network on that site. When switching platforms, if users seek
to retain their existing network, they must not only convince themselves to leave a platform
which may have high utility, but must also convince the rest of their network of individuals,
who in turn, must convince their subsequent networks, and so on and so on. Within this
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process it can be easily imagined that certain individuals may be unwilling to part with
their place on a network such as Facebook or Instagram. Thus, it is highly likely that the
users who leave will see a decrease in their utility in any subsequent platform due to a loss
of network connections. If these consumers can predict this process, they might end up
deciding against this action due to the expected loss in utility.15
Additionally, the nature of digital markets is that differences in social media sites, although not often in quality or in preference toward a specific group, do arise and impact
the “relevant product market”. For example, Facebook is a social media site which allows
users to share links, videos, and photos as well as write text updates. Among other social
media sites, the only main competitors in this sub-genre of social media site are Twitter
and Tumblr (United States House of Representatives 2020). Even a very similar site such as
Reddit can be differentiated by the fact that users cannot “follow” other users to see their
posts in their feeds, instead only following “subreddits” which focus on certain topics. This
functionality is similar in some ways to Facebook’s use of “groups,” though the lack of direct
user connection limits the use of Reddit as a tool for the social connection Facebook fosters.
Instagram, on the other hand, offers a platform for sharing photos and videos alone, with no
option for text-only posts. These seemingly small differences can heavily influence consumer
preferences, especially when deciding whether to leave a social networking site. Beyond just
the potential loss in utility from losing access to the extensive network one had on an existing
site, users may be limited in their options for similar sites. A lack of reasonable substitutes
would further limit the exodus of users from certain social media sites. With the added
aspect that competitors are hampered by the lack of revenue from being a smaller site, it is
apparent that those sites with major user bases are at an extreme competitive advantage in
their respective markets.
A recent development by Meta Platforms also deserves mentioning as it shows the poten15. Prospect theory is a helpful tool to understand the potential for users to be unwilling to part with a
social network which has become a new “reference point”. Furthermore, even if consumers do not predict
the future, since actions in this marketplace can be viewed as asynchronous, it seems reasonable to assume
that users will observe the utility change for those who leave the platform leading to a similar result.
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tial to generate market power the likes of which has rarely, if ever, been seen in history: the
so-called “metaverse”. Although originally a term from science-fiction and futurism, Meta
has begun development of a real-world version of the metaverse, allowing users to interact
in a virtual world. In this world, users can conduct meetings, buy “land,” and essentially
engage in any activity that they could hypothetically do in the real-world. This gives Meta
an extreme amount of power over this market, if one can even call this a single market. It
may be better to describe this possibility as a completely new form of power altogether.
In this situation, Meta has control over the market not just because they are a monopolist
(solitary seller), but because they own the market itself. The extremely high upfront costs of
creating a competing metaverse also limit, if not completely prevent, competition in metaverse development (Weinstein 2021). If Meta can create the software and hardware that
allow people to access a metaverse marketplace, they will have a level of economic power
that Adam Smith and David Ricardo would tremble at. The accepted economic theories implicitly assume that markets are decentralized, and any market power comes from economic
clout associated with market share. But how can they grapple with a company that not only
has major market share, but owns the access to the market and the marketplace itself, thus
allowing it to dictate the rules that govern said market?
The development of the metaverse is in stark contrast to the foundation of the internet.
Although the internet has developed into an all-encompassing aspect of modern society,
similar to what Meta hopes the metaverse will become, it had one major differentiating
factor: its development was not monopolized by a private actor. It is arguable that the
success of the internet was the open-sourced aspect it held from its very inception. If the
internet’s development was dependent on one company, such as the metaverse is to Meta,
development would likely have proceeded slower. Perhaps more importantly for economists,
the monopolized aspect of the metaverse’s development could allow Meta to extract all the
consumer surplus from the market through discriminatory pricing, a possibility all the more
likely with the large swaths of user data collected by Meta.
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3.2

Google/Alphabet
Just as Facebook was not the first social media platform, Google was not the first search

engine. When Sergey Brin and Larry Page developed Google’s base algorithm, PageRank,
in 1998, the predominant search engine was Yahoo! which, like many early search engines,
allowed users to search a pre-indexed directory of sites. PageRank, on the other hand, allowed
web pages to be ranked on relevance based on how often they were cited by other web pages.
Those cited more often would be listed as more relevant than those cited less often (Brin and
Page 1998). This difference led to Google’s search engine becoming the industry standard,
especially as the internet grew at rates which made human indexing impossible.
However, if I were to tell an observer in 2000 that Google would become one of the most
powerful companies, with advertising revenues over $200 billion and a market valuation over
$1 trillion (Alphabet Inc. 2021, 33), they would try to find the best way to tell me I was
crazy. That is because Brin and Page actively created Google as an alternative to the search
engines being used at the time, which they believed had been corrupted by advertising. In
their famous article laying out the basic aspects of the algorithm that would become how
Google searches the internet, Brin and Page state “[c]urrently, the predominant business
model for commercial search engines is advertising. The goals of the advertising business
model do not always correspond to providing quality search to users”. They go on to say
in their determination, with the help of history, “we expect that advertising funded search
engines will be inherently biased towards the advertisers” (Brin and Page 1998).
It is particularly interesting that Google’s founders wrote this in 1998 because that same
year Google began one of its most profitable endeavors to date: selling search terms (Purcel
2005). Since then, Google (and later its offspring parent company, Alphabet) has become
socially ubiquitous with internet search, to the point “google” now means “to search on the
internet”. This is due in part because Google’s search engine is often the first place that any
individual goes in their search of the internet. Google is the default browser on Alphabet’s
Google Chrome and Apple’s Safari web browsers, two of the most popular browsers in the
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world.16 It is even more prevalent in mobile search, since Apple and Google produce the
two most popular operating systems (OS) for mobile phones, iOS and Android, respectively.
Since Google is the default browser for both Safari (Apple’s default mobile web browser) and
for all Android phones, Google has 95% market share in mobile search (Statcounter, n.d.).
This market share gives Google the ability to profit off its position through advertising, but
also influence users’ view of the world, as even the location of a result can influence whether
a user clicks on it. Brin and Page recognized this potential influence as an issue in 1998,
saying that although the web had grown extensively, “the user’s ability to look at documents
has not. People are still only willing to look at the first few tens of results” (Brin and Page
1998). Thus Google, as the main throughway to the internet, can influence what users see
not just from explicitly excluding results, but also from subtly deemphasizing them.
Google, like Meta, has characteristics that have generated lock-in tendencies, which can
make competition in this market extremely difficult, if not impossible. One of the most
obvious ones is Google’s aforementioned role as a default search engine for many users. As
behavioral economists have showed, most prominently by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
in their book Nudge, default settings can greatly influence outcomes. Thus, since Google
is the default for so many users, competitors must both convince users that their product
is better than Google’s and that it is so much better to require a transition. Although the
impact of default settings is not enough to prove Google’s locked in power, when coupled
with the network effects Google benefits from, it can be seen why competition in this market
is so difficult. Google’s algorithm, like any machine learning technique, benefits from more
data. When more users search using Google, Google can fine tune the algorithm, gradually
improving the product over time. The vast number of users and searches done on Google17
grants it access to unprecedented levels of data. With this data, Google can make its algorithm more efficient and productive than any others, enticing users to stay on its platform,
16. Together these two browsers hold 80% of the market as of February 2022. No other web browser breaks
5% of the market. (Statcounter, n.d.)
17. Over 8.5 billion daily or 101,649 per second, as of April 25th 2022 (Internet Live Stats, n.d.).
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if not due to its default nature, then because it is the best search engine. Furthermore, the
associated “foot” traffic that comes with being the default search engine causes Google’s
advertisers to prefer not to leave, further harming potential competitors’ revenue streams.
With limited revenue, the profitability of competitors and thus their ability to continue competing with Google is stifled. Finally, Google has a unique lock-in, namely that its name is
now synonymous with searching something on the internet, giving it an implicit advantage
in the search engine market. This social norm is one that is difficult for any company to
compete with.18
As Google began to expand beyond solely search, some began to fear that it could
use its position in the search market to support its position in other markets. As one
Wall Street Journal article in early 2017 put it, “Google often pushes its growing list of
hardware products. . . in the top ad spot above its search results” with analyses concluding
that nearly 91% of searches had a Google product in the top ad spot (Nicas 2017a). This
behavior becomes even more insidious when one recognizes that the “algorithm” Google uses
to determine ad placement is secret. With this understanding, cases such as the business
software company Bitrix’s precipitous fall appear even more worrisome. At the beginning of
2015, Bitrix ads were appearing on roughly a quarter of searches related to its software with
Google not advertising on that search term. However, when a year and a half later Google
began advertising on Bitrix’s search terms, Google quickly shot up to 70% of the results while
Bitrix’s share of ads fell ten percentage points, while paying 26% more for ads (Nicas 2017a).
What makes this especially worrisome is that Google did not suddenly begin producing the
good associated with those search terms, instead offering a platform that allowed companies
to implement the type of software Bitrix offered.
Google’s dominant position in the search market gives them outsized power over the
18. Although other companies have had similar supportive social norms, such as Kleenex and Xerox, and
seen competition arise, they did not have the same informational power as Google holds today. This power
over information is an important factor that differentiates these digital good markets from physical good
markets. Additionally the scale of their potential markets were limited compared to the scale of the internet
search market.
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information that users see. One example is that of Google’s “knowledge panels” and featured
results which show up on roughly 40% of searches (Nicas 2017b). According to Google’s
Help Center, it shows these results to give users “a quick snapshot of information on a topic
based on Google’s understanding of available content on the web” (Google 2022). However,
Google’s search algorithm seems to have a confirmation bias, as well as a potential bias
towards Google’s own products.
As the following images (Figures 1 and 2) from a sample search show, Google’s featured
results direct users towards pages which reinforce the user’s prior belief, while a more accurate
result may bold a section for each phone or solely highlight a comparison. Looking closely
at the difference of the bolded phrases in the featured results, it appears that the pro-Apple
featured result has more qualifiers such as “reportedly” and specifically mentions that this
applies to “most” instead of all Android phones. When looking at the other results, a snippet
from another site describes why Android is better. On the other hand, when one implies
they already believe Android is better than Apple, the featured result has no qualifiers and
explicitly states in some snippets that Android is better. Here I seek not to do a technological
analysis of Apple iPhones compared to Android phones, rather I am attempting to show that
since Android phones run on a Google developed operating system, it is worrisome to see
Google’s power in the search market influencing users’ views for its own economic benefit.
Beyond being socially worrisome, this action would limit the ability of consumers to truly
obtain full information.
This power of Google goes beyond just the economic, as its position as a major accessway
to the knowledge of the internet gives it immense power to dictate what “acceptable” information is. The power Google has over information is especially important because it now
generates as much revenue from news on its platform as the entirety of the news industry
earns in advertising revenue (Tracy 2019). As mentioned before, news agencies have limited
profit margins, so they must generate traffic however possible, even if that means submitting
to Google’s demands. An impact is also seen on how news companies find their audience. In
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Figure 1: Screenshot of results for query “is Android better than Apple”

Figure 2: Screenshot of results for query “is Apple better than Android”
the past, it was possible for them to direct advertising to a specific group without a middleman. However, now with the rise of the digital economy and how prevalent the internet is,
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these companies are effectively forced to reach their users through the internet. Therefore, if
certain stories threaten to harm their location in Google search results, news agencies have
incentives to change them. Furthermore, since Google sells ads on search results, it may be
harder for small news agencies to grow a subscriber base. If small news sites have limited
access to new subscribers and thus greater funding concentration in news may increase, limiting the democratic ideal of free press. Coupled with PageRank’s tendency to push larger
sites to the top of results (simply because these sites will be cited by other sites more often,
all else equal), a dangerous climate for small news agencies to remain profitable is generated.
Google has also recently attempted to push more “authoritative sources” for news. Backlash against this policy, mainly due to its tendency to narrow the bounds of political discussion, has come from both sides of the political aisle, with former president Donald Trump, as
well as many left-wing organizations, warning of the potential downsides of this policy (Wakabayashi 2018). One left-wing organization’s analysis showed that when Facebook switched
to “more authoritative sources” some of the most well-respected independent and alternative news sites were those that were impacted the most (Andersen 2017). This power of
Google and Facebook to narrow the range of public debate and acceptable language is all
the more unsettling since governments might wield enough power to influence these censorship decisions. If the government can pressure these companies to adjust socially acceptable
discussion, questions arise of expanding the First Amendment’s protections (at least in the
United States).
Similarly to the influence on public discussion, Google has funded academic research that
argues against regulatory challenges of companies in digital markets. Google has gone as
far as allegedly having a “wish list” of papers that it wanted written (Mullins and Nicas
2017). This influence over the academic discussions which shape policy debates further
shows Google’s growing power to shape the world we live in. Furthermore, some authors
who were funded by Google failed to acknowledge this obvious conflict of interest. If authors
are failing to acknowledge conflicts of interest, societal trust in academic work as scientific,
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rather than biased, will be degraded. Even those who try to criticize Google soon see what
standing up to one of the largest firms in the world can do to one’s life. For example, one
critic of Google who worked at a Google-funded think tank was fired after he spoke out in
support of the EU’s antitrust action against tech companies like Google’s parent company
Alphabet (Vogel 2017).
Alphabet’s power comes not only from the market dominance of Google Search, but also
from its ownership of YouTube, a video sharing platform. YouTube has become one of the
most popular sites for people of all ages. With over one billion hours of video watched every
day, it is quickly becoming as prevalent, if not more so, than television. However, unlike
television, which is distributed across many different channels and companies, YouTube
is completely owned by Alphabet. Thus, there is no competition in the oversight of the
information on this platform. Although users may report videos to YouTube, the sheer
quantity of video uploaded each day19 means that it is impossible for human moderators
to ever audit the platform fully.20 Additionally, confirmation biases in the algorithm can
allow individuals to remain in bubbles of their own views fraying the social fabric by limiting
productive bipartisan discussions. The use of deep neural networks, a form of computing
where the computer can “learn” an individual’s preferences from past actions and predict
their future preferences, also means that when the algorithm shows individuals conspiracies
or illegal material, Alphabet engineers are often in the dark as to why (Nicas 2018). This lack
of human agency or oversight in the decision making of these algorithms leads to unintended
outcomes where a responsible human party is difficult to locate.
Alphabet, or, as it is better known, Google, has reached a place that no other company
can claim to have reached: being the main avenue by which most people find knowledge.
This role grants Google an immense power, not only over the digital economy, as users use
its search engine to reach other digital companies, but also gives it an immense social power.
19. Estimated at 720,000 hours each day (or nearly 500 hours every minute).
20. Not to mention the ethical questions associated with having individuals watch triggering and traumatic
videos daily.
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The power to determine what is acceptable information is a power that has never been seen
in a private company’s hands in the past. Even if Google has yet to obviously abuse its
power in this sphere, many social fears have developed from its size alone.
3.3

Amazon
Amazon.com was founded in 1994 primarily as an online bookstore, but in the past 30

years has developed into one of the most prominent companies in the world. Now, Amazon
has expanded into being the predominant online marketplace, one of the largest streaming
sites, as well as the largest web services supplier. Amazon’s immense growth has led its
founder, Jeff Bezos, to become one of the richest people in the world, valued at over $150
billion,21 as well as expanding his political clout with a foray into the newspaper world
through his purchase of the Washington Post. The online marketplace that Amazon has
developed has become so important to every other market that “anyone with goods to sell
wants Amazon to carry them” (Clark and McMillan 2015). This captive demand has granted
Amazon a position that economics has rarely seen before in history: that of a company
owning the marketplace where it competes with other companies.22 Amazon’s ownership of
the market, as well as its expansion into many different industries has caused some observers
to deem Amazon “something radically new in the history of American business” (Packer
2014). This form of market power23 is more prodigious than power derived from market
share, as incentives exist for Amazon to bend the rules of the market for its benefit.
Amazon has also been accused many times of abusing its market ownership position.
In the House of Representatives subcommittee’s report on digital markets, members of the
21. According to Forbes, Bezos’ net worth of $150.1 billion as of April 30th , 2022. See https://www.forbes.
com/profile/jeff-bezos/?sh=1df417e61b23
22. Although there exist examples in history where companies have sold their own brand alongside competitors (e.g., Sears as well as many supermarkets) the digital nature of Amazon, again influences the analysis.
As will be mentioned below, the power over information, in the form of search results on its site, grants
Amazon the power to influence consumer behavior in its favor. In contrast, physical stores do not have the
same ability to influence consumer behavior, limiting the power they can exert.
23. Though it should be noted this is a distinct form of market power from that which companies gain
through market share. Thus, one might instead call this market ownership in distinction to the market power
gained in a decentralized market.
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United States Congress, as well as experts, raise concerns about how trustworthy Amazon’s
“relevant products” algorithm is (United States House of Representatives 2020). Similar
to Google, the report details fears that Amazon may unfairly push its own products over
those of competitors. Furthermore, the committee shows evidence of Amazon using data
collected from its marketplace to determine goods to sell. By determining popular products
and releasing an “Amazon Basics” version for a fraction of the cost to price out the original
producers, Amazon sought to push out competitors and exert monopoly power. This behavior not only drives out existing competitors, but the lower prices (and thus profit margins)
limit the ability for competition to arise in the future. However, even if competition were to
arise, say because Amazon increased prices, it would likely be heavily dependent on using
Amazon’s platform to grow, restarting the cycle once again.
Even beyond its potential abuses of its unique market ownership position, Amazon has
also engaged in more typical monopolistic behaviors. Similar to the actions taken by Standard Oil, Amazon has attempted to vertically integrate through developing its own shipping
service, warehouses (called “fulfillment centers”), and growing its web services. In search of
vertical integration Amazon has threatened the existence of its competitors and suppliers,
in an attempt to lower costs. For example, Amazon has grown its shipping abilities, now
competing with UPS and Federal Express.
Pushing out competitors has not only been accomplished through vertical integration.
Amazon has also used below cost pricing schemes to drive down profit in markets they
enter. Although counter-intuitive that a firm would seek to decrease profits, this action is
no accident as Bezos actively tried to limit profit early on to inhibit potential competitors
from entering the market before Amazon could grow to a size at which competition was near
impossible (Stone 2013, 221). These actions, among others, have led Amazon’s net sales to
reach nearly $500 billion in 2021 (Amazon.com Inc. 2021, 29).
Amazon’s initial role as an online book retailer was also a calculated decision by Bezos to
capitalize on the nature of the market. Since the book retail market was heavily dominated
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by brick-and-mortar stores at the time, such as Barnes & Noble and Borders, Amazon filled
a missing position in the market: a retailer which could use the growing Internet to offer
consumers more options. As a former Amazon executive described, the reason Amazon
began as a bookstore was because the sheer number of books “in and out of print” made
it impossible “to sell even a fraction of them at a physical store” (Packer 2014). Crucially,
Bezos did not initially believe that selling books would be a profitable way for Amazon to
grow, as it was already an industry with tight profit margins and America was not a country
with high demand for books. Instead, Bezos wanted to use the sale of books on Amazon
to collect data on its users. With this data, Amazon would then learn how to sell these
users everything else they could demand, just as described with Google above. Therefore,
Amazon began selling its books at or near cost to increase volume at the expense of profit,
as it sought not to profit from the sale of the books, but the data generated.
Another benefit of the online book retail market was Amazon’s ability to profit and
benefit off the unpaid labor of reviews left by customers for books. Unlike a physical store,
Amazon’s online bookstore could offer consumers the ability to read other customer reviews
of the book, as well as the professional reviews included in a book (Carr 2008). These reviews
gave Amazon a unique distinction from other book sellers: its store offered users reviews by
others like them. Nicholas Carr argues that this was one of the major aspects that led to
Amazon’s meteoric rise in the book selling market, as it allowed Amazon to quickly engulf
a large portion of the book market, but more importantly, to gain extensive valuable user
data.
As mentioned above, Amazon has expanded into many other industries, extending its
economic arms into diverse economic, social, and political realms like the antagonist in the
classic American novel The Octopus by Frank Norris. The industry which Amazon has
profited most from is, perhaps surprisingly, web services. Although Amazon’s market share
(no more than half of the market24 ) is not as extreme as Google or Facebook have in their
24. More so than other markets mentioned so far, web services is a market which analysts have difficulty
defining. Some analysts have termed it infrastructure as a service (“IaaS”) while others look at “public cloud
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respective markets, the dependence of other companies on this service gives Amazon power,
nonetheless. The threat of dependence on Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) is likely one of
the main driving forces pushing Amazon’s market share down from 51.8% in 2017 to 40.8%
in 2020(Loten 2018; Gartner 2021).25
Even while Amazon has seen its overall market share fall, there are still reasons for concern in this market. One source of concern is that Amazon is one of the only companies
that has been approved by the United States government to store classified information on
the cloud (Mann and Mullins 2018). Due to this fact, there have even been examples of
government contracts with no competitors to Amazon due to the lack of required approval.
Moreover, the governmental approval signals to other agencies and companies that Amazon
might have more secure cloud services than any of its competitors. Governments, therefore,
may be growing dependent on AWS similar to companies. However, unlike companies, due
to the bureaucratic nature of government contracts and the high upfront costs of approvals
and proposals, government agencies may have a harder time switching web service providers.
A basic institutional economic understanding can help to elucidate this reasoning. Using the
institutionalist idea of “transaction costs,” one can see how the long time frames for approval (i.e., opportunity costs) and bureaucratic hoops associated with government projects
increase the cost of receiving these contracts. In concert with the economies of scale in
cloud computing,26 these transaction costs make it nearly impossible for smaller companies
to compete with Amazon for government contracts (when they are approved to, that is).
Another worrisome aspect of these military and government contracts is the potential for
services” (Canalys 2021; Gartner 2021). Although these seem like seemingly minor distinctions, it can have
major impacts on the determination of market size. For example, Canalys (2021) finds a “record of $49.4
billion” spent on cloud services in Q3 2021, while Gartner (2021) found that the IaaS market had $64.3
billion spent in 2020, showing an obvious contradiction if the markets investigated are the same. This also
has major impacts on the market share values, with Canalys (2021) finding AWS had 31% of the market in
2020, while Gartner (2021) found that AWS had 40.8%.
25. These values, as mentioned in the previous footnote, are dependent on the definition of the market.
Since this definition is difficult and these values come from different sources, it is hard to know if the market
definition is similar. Thus it may be that Amazon either lost market share or remained somewhat consistent.
26. These economies of scale come from the fact that expanding cloud services requires expanding data
centers. After those data centers are online, expanding user base has minimal to no marginal cost until the
data center is at maximum capacity.
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monopsony power from the government. For example, the government may tell companies
that they are only qualified suppliers if they do not allow certain behaviors on their platforms.
With the major amounts of revenue that government contracts can bring in, major conflicts
of interest can arise. One example is when Amazon revoked Wikileaks’ access to AWS after
pressure from the American government (Wasserman 2012). This offers a reverse rendition of
George Stigler’s idea of “regulatory capture,” whereby regulators adopt the priorities of the
regulated companies. Now the government can develop a form of “regulatory outsourcing,”
whereby it uses private companies to enact changes that it cannot make through the official
regulatory process.
A final important point is that Amazon’s immersion into the smart speaker world has
given it intimate access to user data, even that which users did not actively seek to make
available to Amazon. Since a major part of the attractiveness of smart speakers is their ability
to respond to a certain phrase like “Alexa” or “Ok, Google”, these speakers must always
be passively listening so that they can respond when acknowledged. Although Amazon
has claimed that it does not retain the information that Alexa smart speakers may hear,
there have been multiple lawsuits arguing that they are doing just that. These lawsuits
have focused especially on the potential that Amazon is generating data on users under the
age of thirteen (Morris 2019a).27 Amazon has been accused of compiling this information
without offering parents or users the ability to completely delete it. It has also been accused
of allowing third-party app developers to have limited privacy policies, allowing Amazon’s
smart speakers to be used by third parties to generate information on users without their
knowledge.
3.4

Apple
Compared to the other companies mentioned, Apple tends to generate less antitrust dis-

cussions, seemingly because Apple has not engaged in the buying out of competitors that
27. This focus is due to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPR) of 1998. This is also the
rule that has made most of these companies restrict usage for users under thirteen.
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Facebook and Google are well known to do. Moreover, Apple has not engaged in aggressive
price cutting to generate market share such as Amazon does. Thus, it may appear that
including Apple in this analysis is unnecessary and unwarranted, as it does not have the
same obvious anti-competitive actions or extreme market share as other firms mentioned
prior. However, since this analysis seeks to show how the typical determinants of market
concentration, power, and influence lack the nuance necessary to generate a complete analysis, I will include Apple as a final example to show how these measurements are inadequate
to fully comprehend the latent power.
One example of Apple’s market power is that of its immense power over its App Store.
Due to the “closed” nature of Apple’s mobile operating system, all apps that users can
download must be downloaded from the App Store, which requires developers to get approval
from Apple. The closed nature of its system has allowed Apple to take large commissions on
all transactions, reaching up to 30% in recent years (United States House of Representatives
2020). As recent legal battles from developer Epic Games have shown, Apple leverages its
market dominance to reap concessions out of vendors who are desperate to reach nearly half
of all mobile phone users.
Beyond just being a “closed” operating system, Apple also withholds the ability of any
other phone producers to use its iOS mobile environment. This restriction protects Apple’s
user base by erecting large switching costs associated with leaving the iOS environment.
These costs include the time associated with transferring contacts and applications to a new
operating system, the time required to learn a new operating system’s intricacies, and the
financial burden of paying for certain apps again on a new operating system. Google, in
contrast, specifically designed the Android operating system to be available to any phone
provider and be “unlocked”. Although on the surface Android operating systems dominate
the iOS environment due to their superior “unlocked” characteristics, vast array of phone
producers who use the operating system, and the built-in integration with Google, Apple
does have a major factor in its favor: social norms.
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Apple has benefited from the social status it generated from being the first major company to produce a “smartphone” when the iPhone was released in 2007. Apple has further
protected this status by subtly adding ways to disincentivize users from using other operating
systems. One example is the use of green text bubbles for messages to Android phones. This
decision was a deliberate one made by Apple marketing executives, as evidenced by Tim
Higgins (2022) of the Wall Street Journal. Higgins shows that internal documents released
in the wake of the Epic Games lawsuit detail how Apple executives actively sought to use
this subtle tactic to push users away from Android operating systems. As time has shown,
this action has led to young users criticizing others for having “green text bubbles” (Higgins 2022). Since young users engage with their phones a high rates (with 39% admitting
they felt addicted), this ability of Apple to generate social norms for young users to stay
away from using Android phones can generate lock-in effects that remain for years to come
(Morris 2019b). Moreover, the power of this social norm is visible as although Apple has
only around 30% of the total market share of phones sold, it has over 90% of the profits
(Mickle 2017). To an institutionalist, this is a textbook example of what Veblen described
as “conspicuous consumption,” that is, where consumers choose a product because of the
social status associated with owning it. Since Apple has generated such a powerful brand
name around its products, especially the phones, it has powerful lock-in effects under which
users will buy these product even if other options are better, due to the associated benefit
from social status gained (or rather the forgoing of losing social status).
Apple not only has large amounts of social status and power, it also has extensive economic power. One of the most prominent forms of this power is the extreme levels of cash
that Apple has held at times (reaching nearly $250 billion in 2017). In comparison, this
cash amount is twice as large as the United States had in foreign reserves at the same time
(Mickle 2017).28 Holding such a large quantity of cash gives Apple an enormous potential to
sway both economic and political climates, as this cash can be used to buy out competitors
28. In recent years Apple’s cash amounts have decreased to $195.57 billion as of 2020, an amount still more
than the US at the same time (Bursztynsky 2021).
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or fund lobbying efforts. Moreover, even the seemingly extreme fines levied on Google by
the European Union’s antitrust enforcement agency ($10 billion total) pale in comparison to
this cash pile. Therefore, this cash hoard not only protects Apple from the fear of fines (such
as the ones it may have to pay in the lawsuit with Epic Games) having major impacts on its
profit capabilities, but also causes regulators to question whether fines are feasible options
to influence how Apple behaves in the market.
More recently, Apple has been embroiled in controversy with the major music streaming
service Spotify. The EU competition authority ruled in favor of Spotify in 2021, stating that
Apple was abusing its market power in the App Store. Similar to the Epic Games case, which
revolved around the 30% commissions that Apple takes from in-app purchases and sales of all
products approved on its App Store, Spotify argued that Apple abused its power by forcing
developers to use its own in-app purchasing methods and preventing those developers from
pointing consumers to other options (Reuters and Chee 2021). This action forced companies
to submit to Apple’s commission scheme, further increasing Apple’s power. Reuters reports
that the potential punishment is a maximum of $27 billion (or 13.8% of Apple’s 2020 cash
reserves) while the true number is likely to be lower (Chee 2022). Although it is true this is
not a negligible portion of Apple’s cash reserves, it nonetheless is not an amount that will
likely change its behavior. Instead, these fines are now seen as the cost of doing business.
As of May 2022, Apple has also had charges taken against it regarding mobile pay technology. The EU argues that Apple abused its ownership of the App Store and the closed
nature of its iOS environment to restrict access to necessary software and hardware in the
iPhone and Apple Watch. This action unfairly increased the relative benefit of Apple Pay
(Apple’s mobile payment system) while forcing competitors like PayPal to have limited functionality on Apple products (Satariano 2022). By limiting the functionality of competitors,
Apple pushed users to use its system, and since Apple receives transaction fees from this
product, also pushed more revenue and economic power into its hands.
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3.5

Summary of Section
• Meta has grown to be a ubiquitous piece of the internet. Much of this growth is due
to the large advertising revenue it generates. As advertising on Meta-owned sites such
as Facebook offers firms access to a large number of potential customers, Meta has an
inelastic demand for its advertising space. Combined with the large switching costs
associated with leaving a major social network, Meta’s market power may only be
threatened by society-wide change in preferences.
• Google has an extreme amount of market share in the search engine market. Since
this market is how many access information in today’s world, this share translates into
large advertising revenues as well as power over what information is deemed acceptable.
By influencing information shown to consumers, Google can influence what consumers
choose to purchase.
• Amazon has a unique position in the history of markets, as it owns a marketplace which
it competes on. This sort of power over a market is one that economics has never had
to understand in the past. Furthermore, through the growth of AWS, Amazon has
increased the dependence of other companies, and even countries, on its products.
This creates a captive market for consistent revenue.
• Although Apple has the least antitrust discourse in the literature, it nonetheless has
potential reasons for action. Beyond being the largest company by market capitalization in the world, Apple abuses its position as the owner of the App Store to extract
additional revenue from developers. Moreover, the extreme levels of cash held by
Apple raises questions as to the efficacy of antitrust agencies using fines to punish
anti-competitive behavior.
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4

Review of Mainstream Analyses
The advent of the internet caused many economists at the end of the 20th century to begin

investigating how this new technology would impact economies. One of the main arguments
that first arose was that the vast amounts of information available on the internet would
make economic assumptions that may have previously rested on shaky ground, sturdier. It
was argued the expansion of information at the fingertips of consumers would make the
assumption of perfect information more reasonable. Moreover, the lowered transaction costs
and search costs would make markets behave as they were theoretically expected to, without
deviations caused by transaction costs (Wiseman 2000). Among industrial organizational
theorists there arose those who focused on network economics, which sought to understand
how the rise of the internet would impact market dynamics.
4.1

Network Externalities
As Shy (2011) puts it, network economics studies the impact of so-called “network effects”

on markets, in particular, how consumer utility and/or firm profits can be impacted by the
size of the user base using a certain technology. Network effects on the demand side exist
when greater user base size increases or decreases utility for an individual user (e.g., social
media sites see positive network effects because greater user base means greater probability
of finding friends, news, stores to interact with, etc.). On the other hand, they can also exist
on the supply side, such as when the number of firms using a certain technology impacts the
profits of each firm (e.g., firms deciding whether to make their software compatible with a
competitor’s).29 It is important to recognize that network effects are not unique to digital
markets, but they have grown to new levels in these markets. For example, a brick-andmortar store has network effects from having more individuals in the store. At first it is a
positive network effect as the crowd can signal to other potential consumers that the store is
29. This example will be explained in depth later in this section.
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popular, but as the size of the “user base” grows a negative network effect develops due to
overall congestion in the store. However, online stores do not have this same issue of network
effects inflecting after a certain point.
4.2

Zero Prices
A major issue that arose early in the economic analysis of the impact of the internet

was how to handle miniscule (or potentially zero) marginal costs associated with products
in these markets. As a study that initially focused on material products, which require time,
energy, and effort to produce, economics was not initially well suited for understanding these
issues. For example, as Shy (2001) shows, it may be that the profit maximization condition
(i.e., marginal cost equal to marginal revenue) results in negative profits in markets with
high upfront costs and low marginal costs. Furthermore, these low marginal costs are not
associated with any loss of information or value.30 Beyond the potential issues associated
with low (or zero) marginal costs, zero prices lead to difficulties for economic analysis. In
standard economic analysis, prices are seen as encapsulating all the relevant information
and consumers determine consumption based on prices (an objective measure) and quality
(a subjective measure). However, when prices are zero, consumers are unable to compare
products through an objective measure like prices and must rely on subjective measures such
as quality. If consumers are unable to compare products easily they will be less likely to
switch from the incumbent firm in a market to a potential competitor (Lancieri and Sakowski
2021).
Although I have not found many explicit descriptions of the impact of zero prices in relation to digital markets, behavioral economics has developed nuanced ideas of how individuals
interact with zero prices in other markets. The interesting behaviors seen with zero prices
30. Shy (2001) gives the example of photocopies compared to digital copy creation. Photocopies, although
low marginal cost, are associated with quality loss (and eventually lose all value after successive photocopies
are photocopied). On the other hand, digital copies can be copied an infinite number of times without seeing
any data loss (assuming no corruption in file transfer, no software which blocks copying, etc.).
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has caused some to term them “special” (Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely 2007).31 Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely (2007) argue that zero price likely has a special property because
consumers that see a zero-price correlate it with no cost, and thus might have a positive
affective response to that price (i.e., they feel an emotional gain from this “free” good). If
consumers use this response in their determination of consumption behavior, this could help
to describe why zero prices see such a large increase in consumption. A similar description
could describe the seemingly “sticky” nature of zero prices.32 Although Shampanier et al.
focus on the decrease of prices, their data imply that inverting the direction of price change
(i.e., increasing prices from free to small positive) would have the effect of greatly decreasing
consumption. This increase in price above zero would lead to users decreasing consumption
much more than would be expected if zero was non-special. Thus, the specialness of zero
can explain why there are few examples of digital platforms that charge even small positive
prices in markets with consistently zero prices (e.g., social media and search results). Even
if a platform did charge a small positive price, the above argument shows why this platform
will likely have difficulty competing with zero price platforms.
Zero prices also raise questions as to what market power entails in these markets. Usually,
market power is seen as the ability for a firm to charge higher than optimal prices, but when
prices are zero (and remain zero as we see even in highly concentrated markets such as search
engines) this causes issues for mainstream economic theory. Zero prices cause issues in the
application of econometric methods to determine relevant markets, especially the two main
econometric methods for determining relevant markets: the hypothetical monopolist test
(HMT) and small significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test. The SSNIP test
assesses the substitutability of certain products, while the HMT is a thought experiment to
determine whether a market is defined too broadly, which is then operationalized through
the SSNIP test.33
31. At the other extreme end, some have argued that a lack of a price necessitates a lack of a market, since
there must be no commercial relationship at play (see Calvano and Polo 2021).
32. That is to say that once prices have reached zero, it is difficult to return to a positive price.
33. For the HMT, if a hypothetical perfect monopolist could not exert market power on the market under
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Recently Gans (2022) has developed a model that explains the use of zero prices. Gans
argues that since a large of portion of consumers in any market will derive zero utility from
a good, zero acts as an anchor for the resulting prices. Through assuming consumers have
“free disposal,” that is, they can freely stop using a product, he shows that zero price can
be a welfare maximizing outcome. Gans admits that he uses the assumption of rational
agents in his paper, while also contrasting his work with that of Shampanier, Mazar, and
Ariely (2007), saying that their study focused on physical goods and thus might not be
generalizable. Gans’s model also finds that negative prices may be welfare reducing due to
the associated overproduction of goods. Gans thus comes to a conclusion that goes against
accepted antitrust economics: with zero prices “competition (and lower pricing) may not
improve welfare” (Gans 2022, 175).
4.3

Two-Sided Markets
Before delving deeper into the approaches of mainstream economists, it will be helpful

to detail what definition of digital markets mainstream economists use.34 As Lancieri and
Sakowski (2021) define them in their review of economic approaches to digital market competition, these markets are ones where the “[digital] companies can be generally understood
as intermediaries that connect two or more groups of users and, in doing so, benefit from
direct and indirect network effects [italics in original].” This intermediary position leads to
the creation of multi-sided markets (Lancieri and Sakowski 2021; Krämer and Wohlfarth
2018; Calvano and Polo 2021; Shy 2011). Multi-sided markets can thus help to explain why
production of digital products continue, even when the profit maximization condition could
yield net losses. Although firms may be losing money on one side of the market, they may
be more than making up for it on the other side.
question, then the market is defined too broadly. One can see that this implicitly assumes a price setting
power, which causes issues when prices are zero. It is true that this test could be performed where market
power includes the power to set quantity or quality (which would still be a subjective measure making
econometric analysis difficult), but since the operationalization relies on prices, I focus on this issue.
34. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the same definition, so my critique of these approaches focuses
more so on the approach itself rather than pedantic market definitions.
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The most prevalent form of these multi-sided markets in this analysis is where one side
is users of the service, and the other side is firms seeking to advertise to those users. A
main distinction between multi-sided markets35 and unidimensional markets is that while
unidimensional markets only have a price level (assuming no price discrimination), multisided markets have both a total price level (across all sides) as well as a price structure (i.e.,
how that price level is distributed over the sides). Thus, even though some digital products
(e.g., search and (most) social media) are provided free of charge to the user, that does not
imply that the provider did not profit from the relationship. Indeed, one can easily imagine
how companies which supply two-sided markets with advertising could end up supplying one
side’s product free of charge or even with a subsidy attached (i.e., a negative price) while
seeing the same overall price level. A telling example is the testimony Mark Zuckerberg
(Meta’s CEO) gave to the United States Senate in 2018, in which Senator Orrin Hatch asks
how Facebook could make money if it was a free service, to which Zuckerberg responded
“Senator, we sell ads”.

Figure 3: Depiction of a Simple Two-Sided Market
Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003) argue that monopolistic firms interacting
35. For the remainder of the thesis, many analyses will entail two-sided markets, but it is hypothetically
possible to expand these to higher dimensional markets, though mathematically difficult.
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with a two-sided market will seek to “get both sides on board.” A brief example of a previous
two-sided market will help to illuminate the nature of these markets (see Figure 3 for a
depiction of a simple two-sided market). Such an example is credit cards. Credit card
companies (e.g., Visa and Mastercard) cannot focus too heavily on one side of the market
compared to the other. They see that the greater the user base using the credit card,
the more attractive it is to sellers to accept it as payment, while simultaneously, the more
sellers that accept the card as payment, the more attractive it is to potential users. This
interconnected aspect of the market means that actions that may appear to have limited
impact on consumer welfare (such as credit card company charging firms fees) can indirectly
impact consumers.
Taking Google and Meta as examples, both seek to make their product (search results and
social media, respectively) as attractive to their users as possible to maximize the valuation
of their site to advertisers. Incorporating the data that these platforms generate would
make many of the users what Rochet and Tirole term “marquee buyers” of the advertising
product. Rochet and Tirole describe a marquee buyer as a buyer which gives a seller a large
surplus. Put another way, these marquee buyers are those which increase sellers demand
for the platform, allowing platforms to increase seller price. One could argue that “buyers”
in these markets (i.e., users of the platform) are not only marquee buyers, but also what
Rochet and Tirole describe as “captive buyers” due to the lock-in effects mentioned above.
Although true that they are captive in some sense, Rochet and Tirole were focused on the
demand impact, and the advertising benefit to firms increases their demand. Thus, even
though these users may in some sense be “captive,” they nonetheless are generating large
surpluses for the sellers unlike the captive buyers Rochet and Tirole describe, which would
result in lower prices for sellers. As they show, when a monopolist in control of a two-sided
market has marquee buyers, the sellers will see an increased price and in turn the buyers
will see a decreased price (in our example, zero price).36
36. An interesting result that arises here with respect to zero prices is what happens when buyers become
progressively more “marquee,” even after prices have reached zero. This theory would imply that an optimal
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However, unlike credit cards, which have complimentary demands on both sides, digital
markets may see conflicting consumption preferences across sides. As shown above, advertisers value the potential advertisements on a platform more when that platform has more
users, like how sellers value accepting a certain credit card more when more buyers use
that card, all else equal. However, users of digital markets (such as social media or search
engines) gain negative utility with greater permeation of advertisers.37 This leads to these
platforms having conflicting demands. As more users join the platform, more advertisers
want to advertise on the platform. Then, as more advertisers are on the platform, this leads
to some users leaving the platform, causing less advertisers to want to advertise. With less
advertisers on the platform, this might incentivize users to rejoin the platform, repeating the
process, ad infinitum.38
More recent expansions in the industrial organization literature regarding two-sided markets have led to some interesting results. Bolt and Tieman (2008) expand on work by Armstrong (2006) to show that under constant elasticities of demand on both sides of the market,
highly skewed pricing is profit maximizing. In particular, the highly elastic nature of buyer
demand (in our earlier example the demand of users of the platform) is used to generate
demand from sellers by offering buyers extremely low prices.39 Behavioral economists have
recently sought to incorporate ideas such as the reference effect to argue that the reference
price on one side can influence the price charged on the other (Li and Zhang 2020). Through
this process, Li and Zhang add nuance to the results of Rochet and Tirole (2003). Armpolicy for a profit-maximizing monopolist with a large network effect is to offer a subsidy to the buyers,
while increasing the price on the sellers. An analysis of this will be taken up in the next section.
37. Calvano and Polo (2021) argue that advertising should be seen as the shadow price of the use of the
platform. Others argue that the advertising is informative and thus gives users more information. This
seems to rest on the unreasonable assumption that all advertising is truthful, or at least users can always
glean the truth of advertising.
38. For the sake of this example, let us ignore the potential that users have switching costs. As described
above, switching costs could lock-in users to these platforms so that even the rise in advertisers would not
decrease user base.
39. Importantly, Bolt and Tieman specifically report that their model does not support a zero price, but
Armstrong’s model allows for zero and negative prices. However, Armstrong does not mathematically prove
the profit maximizing nature can be found from highly skewed prices (though it can be implied from his
work).
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strong’s (2006) work also points out how the equilibrium price structure and level depend
on the size of the externalities that interact across the sides of the market and whether
individuals use many sites, or only one.
The impact of individuals using many different sites has been extensively researched,
often under the term “multihoming”. Many experts view multihoming40 as a potential
constraint on the anti-competitive nature of network effects, as it can limit the complete
monopolization of a consumer base (Lancieri and Sakowski 2021). With respect to benefits,
early authors often argued that users who could multi-home (due to “compatibility”) would
have lower welfare, due to incentives to charge lower prices facing firms which produce
incompatible products (Shy 2001, 2011). Oz Shy argues this incentive arises because of
the switching costs associated with incompatible products. If firms are to incentivize users
to abandon a competitor’s product and accrue the associated switching costs, they must
lower their prices, in a sense subsidizing the costs that users face in switching.41 Thus
there will exist higher prices for the side which can multihome in comparison. Armstrong
(2006) develops a model where multihoming exists on one side of the market, while the other
side singlehomes.42 In this situation, he shows that the side that multi-homes will have
its interests ignored, with the single-home side and producer’s surplus being maximized.
However, recent research has raised criticisms regarding the universality of Armstrong’s
claim. Belleflamme and Peitz (2019) argue that in certain situations it may not be the case
that the side that engages in multihoming will necessarily see a lower welfare. Generally,
they argue that there exist situations where platforms can achieve their desire to have the
seller side single home universally, partially, or never.43 Moreover, they show that there exist
40. In the earlier credit card example, “multihoming” would be comparable to using more than one credit
card.
41. It can be seen how this theoretical understanding ignores the potential for social status associated with
certain brands.
42. A representative example is how consumers typically single home into computer operating systems (i.e.,
Apple OS or Windows), while app developers instead multi-home to access the maximum number of users.
43. Some authors have called this “Schumpeterian competition” or “competition for the market”, in contrast
to “competition in the market” (Calvano and Polo 2021; Katz 2021). This process could also be seen as a
version of product differentiation, since if products are differentiated enough it may be nearly impossible to
truly multi-home due to vastly different functionalities. This differentiation can be seen in social media, as

51

cases where both sides and the platform see gains in surplus when sellers multihome. They
also develop two related propositions that relate closely to an antitrust authority seeking to
maximize consumer welfare: i) forcing singlehoming on sellers who would prefer to multihome
leads to an ambiguous impact on seller surplus, but certainly a decrease in surplus to the
buyers and ii) if buyers see lower welfare through seller multihoming, then sellers and the
platform certainly see benefits.
4.4

How Do Network Effects Impact Digital Markets?
With the expansion of the internet to ever more markets, economists began to see that

networks effects were having major impacts on these new digital marketplaces. The seminal
paper that introduced the ideas of network externalities to economics was Katz and Shapiro
(1985). Although before the rise of the digital markets investigated in this thesis, Katz
and Shapiro detail how there can be positive consumption externalities in certain markets.
These externalities are especially prevalent when the quality of a good, service, or platform
is dependent on how large the network is already.44 As digital markets have proved to be
especially prone to network effects, economists have begun to expand on Katz and Shapiro’s
early work. Alan Wiseman (2000) argues that this updating of economic theory was needed
because, unlike before, digital markets do not experience the same constraint on network
effects that congestion effects had on earlier networks like telecommunications. He also
explains that for networks to be “viable” they must have large enough initial population. In
Katz and Shapiro’s original formulation, this would be a signal influencing the consumer’s
rational expectation of the future market size. Wiseman argues this necessity of initial
population can help to explain two aspects of digital markets with network effects: i) that
entrants into these markets tend to enter with low prices that may be increased over time,45
each site has its own functionalities, with limited comparable features across sites. This means that it may
be nearly impossible to truly multihome in social media.
44. This includes maintenance of a good, such as service on a car. The quality and options for car service
professionals depends on how prevalent a make and model of car is.
45. Wiseman ignores the zero prices under investigation here likely because the prevalence of these was
limited at the time of his writing
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and ii) that the success of a firm is highly dependent on the expectations around its success
that its potential users have.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) also introduced a formal explanation of the incentives regarding compatibility of products, which has been further developed since their initial paper.
Consumers prefer compatibility of products so that they can lower their costs and still receive the same utility. On the other hand, producers prefer to produce only incompatible
products since this would allow them to have greater product differentiation and thus less
competition, as well as lower production costs (Shy 2001).46 Although seemingly inconsequential, Shy (2001) argues that consumers are actually worse off when firms sell compatible
machines, even though the consumers prefer compatibility because the impact of network
size is mitigated47 when firms universally sell compatible products. Since firms no longer
need to offer lower prices to accommodate the switching costs associated with transferring
between incompatible systems, the equilibrium prices will be higher in compatibility than in
incompatibility.48 Although firms will charge higher prices when they produce compatible
products and thus lower the welfare of consumers, theoretical formulations have shown that
total social surplus will still increase due to the much greater welfare increase for suppliers
(Shy 2001, 2011).
The relationship between social surplus and consumer surplus in these markets, as well
as the competitive impacts of network effects, cause issues for antitrust agencies acting to
maximize consumer welfare and preserve competition.49 According to the theoretical developments in Shy (2001), preserving competition and maximizing consumer welfare may be
46. This explanation by Shy may be one of the weaker he offers, as for contemporary firms it may be that
incompatibility involves greater costs, since they must develop an associated operating system, like in the
case of computers or smart phones, or the like. A further analysis will be done in the next section.
47. This is because the network effects impact all firms equally in this example. Thus, there is no impact
on pricing that includes this factor.
48. Shy (2001, 18–31) gives a detailed proof of this result. In short, if α is a parameter that determines
the added utility to users from compatibility and η is the number of users of a platform, then prices in
compatibility are 2αη greater than they are in incompatibility. This value becomes significant as η increases
even for limited impacts of compatibility on user utility.
49. Note in many instances preserving competition will maximize aggregate social welfare, through either
innovation, lower prices, higher quality, or many other potential benefits. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily
true that the action which maximizes aggregate social welfare, simultaneously maximizes consumer welfare.
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mutually exclusive in some situations. Since he shows that large market shares incentivize
incompatibility (which increases consumer surplus, but lowers social surplus), in some instances, antitrust authorities must determine what directive is more important. Evidence
seems to show most authorities determine that consumer welfare is the more important of
these two, or at least behave that way (Neven and Röller 2005).50 Thus, antitrust agencies
may maximize consumer welfare by allowing monopolization, or at least having a lax merger
policy. This could lead to more innovation in these markets if the probability of profit is low
for entrants (thus leading to low expected profits) or increase competition if potential mergers incentivize entrepreneurs to innovate (Motta and Peitz 2020; Katz 2021). Thus, some
economists have argued in favor of lax merger policy to increase innovation in these markets,
which may then lead to future competition since network effects have pro-competitive effects
(Calvano and Polo 2021).51
On the other hand, other economists argue that merger policy in digital markets has
been too lax. One of the major theoretical developments on the anti-competitive impacts of
network effects in digital markets is the idea of a “kill zone” in the development of companies.
As Kamepalli, Rajan, and Zingales (2021, 2) describe it, a kill zone arises because “platforms might acquire any potential competitors, dissuading others from entering, and thus
preventing innovation from serving as the competitive threat that is traditionally believed
to keep monopoly incumbents on their toes”. These kill zones can also arise through the
switching costs that users face. Users who face switching costs may wait for new technology
to become broadly integrated (i.e., have a large network). This consumer hesitation can, in
turn, make new entrants undervalued by the market and allow incumbents to cheaply buy
out this potential competition. Moreover, these buyouts by incumbents disincentivize future
50. Crandall and Winston (2003), however, argue there is no empirical evidence that antitrust actions have
increased consumer welfare.
51. These pro-competitive effects arise from a similar process as the anti-competitive ones. Just as network
effects mean that when network size increases utility increases, if an entrant can incentivize some users
to defect to their platform, they can simultaneously increase the value of their network and decrease the
value of the incumbent’s. This exodus can then cause a chain reaction if users have heterogeneous utility
functions where the entrant now produces greater utility than the incumbent for some of the incumbent’s
users, allowing for quick growth of the entrant and a loss of user base for the incumbent.
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investment in entrants in that market by venture capitalists, as the evidence of market deals
show (Kamepalli, Rajan, and Zingales 2021). Thus, decreasing mergers (or buyouts52 ) can
be a way to incentivize investment by venture capitalists to generate innovations and grow
competition in the market.
Some economists have raised concerns about how the extremely rapid rates of innovation
and technological change may cause mergers that seem benign to have major anti-competitive
effects. In a response to Crandall and Jackson (2011), Timothy Brennan (2011) argues
that technology change in digital markets may necessitate strict merger policy to limit the
potential anti-competitive nature of early acquisition. With more resources, incumbents
can more easily enact mergers with new entrants who have promising (or put another way,
threatening) technology. These mergers can be anti-competitive if much of the innovation
in the market will be engulfed by the incumbent. Calvano and Polo (2021) show that the
incumbent would take over these new developments as it has a greater incentive to invest
in innovation due to the “efficiency effect.”53 It is important to note that for this process to
be truly pro-innovation, incumbent firms must be incentivized to bring these innovations to
market, otherwise this innovation will not impact consumers at all.
Beyond the lower incentive to innovate for monopolists described by Kenneth Arrow
(1962), these monopolists may also have an incentive to not bring new developments to market. If these developments are brought to market by a monopolist, they may “cannibalize”
the demand for the monopolist’s other products. Especially in markets with network effects,
the monopolist’s profits may fall if they allow for this innovation (Calvano and Polo 2021).
Thus, Calvano and Polo conclude that incumbent firms in digital markets will have both a
greater incentive to invest in innovation and a greater incentive to not allow this innovation
52. This example shows an important issue in the antitrust literature: there is limited clarity as to what
denotes a “merger” and what denotes a “buyout”. For example, the FTC has “Merger Guidelines” that
denote how to determine whether to allow a merger, but has no similar document for buyouts. To my
knowledge, mergers tend to be seen as two relatively similarly sized firms merging, while buyouts tend to
be seen more as one large firm “buying out” a smaller firm. For the sake of consistency, I will only use the
term “merger” from now on, regardless of the size of the individual firms.
53. This is even more prevalent in the case of large economies of scale, such as those seen in digital markets.
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to enter the market, thus lowering efficiency. This unproductive innovation can be accomplished by either merging with potential competitors or by investing heavily in R&D and
using patents to increase barriers to entry in the market. Importantly, this has been shown
empirically with Google, Apple, Meta, and Amazon’s mergers over the past two decades
(Gautier and Lamesch 2021).
However, some argue this process might be necessary. Fishman, Gandal, and Shy (1993)
argue that constant innovation in a market with durable goods (such as digital markets54 ),
may mean no equilibrium can be reached. This is because the benefit of switching to nondurable production is increased profits and revenue from more sales, while the costs are
typically in the form of harder to measure status and reputation costs. Thus, it may be
optimal for a producer to have planned obsolesce or some other constraint on the durability
of the goods offered in order to guarantee innovation (Shy 2001). By extension, if the society
seeks continual innovation, and production of durable goods can stifle innovation due to
limited potential profits, there would be reason for social support of planned obsolescence.
Katz (2021) also details a potential threat that this preference for merging can have
on the innovation of the market, which is shown in the following example. Let us assume
there is a subset of users of a platform that would prefer to use another platform due to
some perceived negative aspect of the incumbent (such as Facebook’s potential censorship
or Google’s data collection). These users are the ones most likely to leave the incumbent
platform for a new entrant. As detailed above, this initial transfer of users from one platform
to another will increase the expected utility of the new entrant, while decreasing the utility
of the incumbent. However, if mergers are extremely common (as we see in digital markets
today) or if much innovation is done for the sake of merging into a bigger company later, these
activist users may be discouraged from transferring. Put another way, if these users expect
54. I believe it is fair to label most digital products as durable goods. Google and Facebook offer durable
products since users gain utility over time from these products rather than in one use. If one focuses on
the fact that Amazon mainly offers the marketplace for sales and the cloud computing platforms it has with
AWS, it too offers durable goods. Lastly, Apple offers durable goods both in hardware (iPhone, iPad, Mac,
etc.) and software (MacOS and iOS).
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that a new platform will eventually be merged with the incumbent, they may see much less
utility in this potential move. If the expected utility gain is lower than the switching costs
associated with leaving the incumbent, they may decide to remain with the incumbent, even
if they would prefer otherwise.
As companies in digital markets have grown more powerful, they have also begun to
bundle their products. One such example is Google’s behavior with its OEMs (original
equipment manufacturer). Google supplies its Android mobile OS for free to OEMs under
some strict conditions: Google Search must be the default search engine and a suite of Google
apps must be preloaded (Etro and Caffarra 2017). This behavior has been viewed as both procompetitive as well as anti-competitive, depending on the economist. As Economides (1996)
shows, if the network effect is sufficiently large in a Cournot quantity game, incumbents
will invite entry and license their product at little to no cost,55 thus increasing competition.
However, this does not consider the nature of firms competing for the market. Namely, if
firms are competing for the market, it may be in the firm’s best interest to initially actively
incentivize competition to expand the market, only to later abuse their incumbent power.56
It is also possible that Google recognized the large network effects of their Android OS and
instead of taking the risk of competing with entrants in smartphone production, opted to
use this product to further entrench its market power in another market (i.e., search). This
decision may also protect Google from antitrust action (or at least extensively delay it)
through the market complexities (Etro and Caffarra 2017).
The above examples illuminate an important complexity for antitrust action in digital
markets: cutting edge economic theory can support vastly different antitrust policies. It can
support active merger control to limit the impact of a “kill zone” and support innovation by
increasing the likelihood that new technologies are brought to market by entrants. At the
55. He argues that it is even possible the incumbent will pay a subsidy to entrants!
56. If there is limited production capabilities initially, firms may license their product out to increase
production and permeation, only to later abuse their power to extract surplus from other suppliers. By
increasing production and permeation, these firms can develop norms around use of their product that can
support future profit.
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same time, economic theory can support the use of lax merger policy to increase innovation
and competition if network effects are large enough. These dichotomous, yet theoretically
supported, arguments further show why a detailed analysis of digital markets is necessary
to understand how to properly apply the advancements of mainstream economic theory.
Another layer of complexity is added by the fact that the FTC determines antitrust action
based on a consumer welfare standard. As Fishman, Gandal, and Shy (1993) argue, it may
be that supporting consumer welfare (say by outlawing planned obsolescence) could threaten
the incentives for innovation. Thus, a law that would theoretically increase innovation, could
actually decrease it.
4.5

How Does Commodified Data Impact Antitrust?
Just as network effects and zero prices cause issues for antitrust action, so does the

data that companies in digital markets collect on their users. These data is often used to
offer advertisers the ability to target specific demographic groups in their campaigns, but
can also be used to generate economies of scope. Using data to allow easier entry into
new markets is particularly difficult for antitrust authorities to grapple with. On the one
hand, allowing firms to have this data to enter new markets could be efficient, as firms
could be expanding to market segments that are underdeveloped. On the other hand, due
to the nature of digital markets, firms with dominant market positions in one market can
generate more data than those who lack a dominant position. With these data, dominant
firms can more easily enter, and restructure their whole business model to, a new market.57
This complicates the antitrust agency’s role since they have self-imposed rules that require
determinations of “relevant markets.” However, with economies of scope these “relevant
markets” can be constantly changing, complicating, if not eliminating, the ability to define
them, a particularly pressing issue when one considers the length of antitrust action(Krämer
57. As mentioned above, Amazon began as an online bookstore, but Jeff Bezos specifically chose this market
to capitalize on the economies of scope it could offer. With these economies of scope in place, Amazon has
now expanded to be a more general online marketplace, as well as a cloud computing supplier, smart home
electronics producer, and more.
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and Wohlfarth 2018).
For example, the FTC took around 12 years (1998-2010) to act on Intel regarding anticompetitive behavior in the market for microprocessors.58 In that same 12-year period,
Amazon went from being solely an online bookstore in 1998,59 to, by 2010, being the predominant cloud computing supplier,60 ebook hardware (i.e., the Kindle) and software supplier,
and the main internet marketplace. If the FTC were attempting to act on Amazon in 1998
and took a similar length of time as its process on Intel, any analysis of the market in 1998
would be useless by 2010. Even if the FTC could prove anti-competitive actions by Amazon
in online bookselling, this market would be a minor portion of Amazon’s current product
sphere. Thus, any action on Amazon’s online bookselling would be overly specific. On the
other hand, if the FTC tried to use the evidence from 1998’s focus on online bookselling to
argue for action against Amazon’s entire online marketplace, Amazon would likely rebut by
criticizing the action as too broadly defining the market. Instead, they could say, the FTC
should only act on the online bookselling as that was the “relevant market.” Thus, it can be
seen that the use of relevant markets with the existence of economies of scope causes major
complexities, and limits the extent of antitrust policy.
The economies of scope associated with the data generated in digital markets, as well as
the increased ability to extract consumer surplus, have also been termed anti-competitive by
some economists. Some economists argue that companies with superior data, often gained
from market share, can gain a “non-transient competitive advantage” (Krämer and Wohlfarth 2018, 166). This advantage arises from superior data, especially on platforms where
algorithms can increase user demand and interaction. This increased interaction increases
the quantity of data, and by extension, the quality of said data. This, in turn, starts a feedback loop, whereby the initial winner gains an advantage over its competitors with respect
to data. Unlike in other markets, product innovation in quality may not be as productive
58. This length is calculated from the initial FTC complaint in 1998 and the eventual settlement made in
2010.
59. Amazon purchased a book publisher in 1998: its first entrance into a market outside of book selling.
60. By this time cloud computing was also their most profitable sector.
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in these markets at threatening dominant firms due to the large lock-in and network effects.
However, one option does exist for potential competitors: innovate in the ability to extract
more data from users.
This option for competitors arises for two reasons. First, it is obvious that if competitive
advantage is dependent on the quality of data a firm has, then entrants (which have limited
breadth of data) would seek to increase the depth of the data they collect per user. This
increase in data per user would increase the quality of the data, by the same process described
above. However, the second reason this arises shows why many firms that have attempted
to compete with Google, Meta, Amazon, and Apple by being focused on privacy have failed:
advertisers lose heavily if they can’t target ads while their competitors can (Lancieri and
Sakowski 2021). Alternatively, it may be that advertisers do not materially lose, but that
there is a socially accepted idea that targeted advertising has benefits. This would then
mean that even though advertisers may not lose from a lack of targeted ads, they believe
they are losing, which nonetheless influences their behaviors.61 These advertisers will have
less efficient advertising campaigns, or at least believe they will, if they do not use targeted
advertising.62 Thus, a profit-maximizing firm seeking to maximize expected utility for the
lowest cost will choose the platforms which have the most data on their users, allowing for
the most targeting of advertisements. This not only increases the market power of these
platforms, but can also lead to a trend towards greater data collection, barring any change
to institutions.
This market trend toward more extensive data extraction raises antitrust concerns.
Krämer and Wohlfarth (2018) argue that since many digital markets might be considered
contestable and a robust definition for relevant markets is near impossible, market power
should not be understood through market share, but rather, through quality of data. How61. See Liu-Thompkins (2019) for a review of the effectiveness of digital advertising. In short, there appears
to be a positive effect from targeted digital advertising, but the magnitude is unknown.
62. Exceptions may exist for this. For example, a VPN (Virtual Private Network) or encryption software
company, which can assume that users privacy focused platform will value its product, may advertise more
on these platforms than others. Nonetheless, this is a minor sub-group of companies advertising online.
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ever, two problems arise for the antitrust agency here: how do they access the proprietary
data that these firms have in a fair way and how do they determine the quality of this data?
These questions are currently not only unanswered in the literature, but rarely, if ever, posed
even in rhetorical form. Furthermore, antitrust agencies must determine whether this data
collection is a threat to consumer welfare. They must determine whether users view privacy
as a beneficial aspect of a platform (and, by extension, lack of privacy a threat to their
welfare). This gives rise to what Krämer and Wohlfarth (2018) term the “privacy paradox”,
where many users claim to greatly prefer privacy and view lack of privacy as a major threat
to their welfare, yet their actions directly contradict this. The privacy paradox heavily relies
on the mainstream assumption that users have full information and ignores the potential
for the impact of lock-in effects and/or switching costs. When this assumption is relaxed, it
is no longer necessarily a paradox since users could be unaware of the privacy risk, or unable to change for other structural issues. Interestingly, Lancieri and Sakowski (2021) show
that there exists limited evidence of competition in digital markets around privacy concerns,
raising concerns about whether increasing competition would support innovation of privacy
policies.
Another important aspect of consumer preferences regarding privacy is that unlike most
products, an individual’s privacy is dependent on the privacy decisions of those around
them. As Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein (2015) point out, “sharing personal
information with others makes them ‘co-owners’ of that information and, as such, responsible
for its protection.” Beyond the moral role of individuals to protect the information they
have received, the extensive datasets controlled by major platforms allow for exceptionally
accurate interpolations regarding members of a demographic group. As digital rights lawyer
Lizzie O’Shea puts it “we all end up bound by decisions made by others to consent to
invasive data collection practices” (O’Shea 2019, 15). Therefore, antitrust agencies are not
only put in the difficult position of determining whether to follow consumers stated or shown
preferences, but if they choose to protect privacy, there is no middle ground. To truly protect
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privacy, an antitrust agency must make sweeping changes, the sort of which are extremely
difficult and time-consuming actions.
This detailing of contemporary industrial organization theory shows how complex digital
markets are. This complexity makes it difficult to use prior antitrust standards on these
rapidly changing markets. Moreover, with the speed that some digital market players have
grown to large sizes,63 if antitrust agencies take years of litigation to reach a decision, these
companies can continue their anti-competitive actions unchecked for years. Moreover, assuming these companies have knowledge that the agency is acting, they may actively seek to
rearrange their business model using the economies of scope inherent in digital markets to
further complicate any actions. Antitrust agencies have been integral parts of competition
policy in major economies for nearly a century. However, they were developed well before
the rise of digital markets. By relying on outdated standards, they are limiting their ability
to achieve their goals in the modern economy, or worse, acting in ways that contradict their
standard.
4.6

Summary of Section
• Most mainstream analyses of market power require an understanding of relevant markets. The empirical tests that are currently used for this task are unable to handle
the intricacies of digital markets. They also ignore the interconnected aspects of these
markets.
• Digital markets tend to be multi-sided. Multi-sided markets have theoretical outcomes
that seemingly diverge from typical economic theory, such as divergent pricing structures across sides due to network effects. These pricing schemes include zero and
negative prices.
• Modern economic theory does not have a consensus regarding the impact of network

63. Roughly 10 years for Google, Meta, and Amazon. Apple had a much longer growth period with peaks
and valleys.
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externalities on competition. Some argue that they may increase competition, while
others argue that they decrease competition. This disagreement has led to vastly
different proposed policy remedies.
• The commodification of data has led to economies of scope for digital companies. These
economies of scope cause issues for antitrust agencies that depend on relevant markets,
as a company’s relevant market can be constantly changing.

5

Towards an Institutional Analysis
As has been shown, mainstream industrial organization theorists have done extensive re-

search on the topic of digital markets. This research has led to a number of advancements in
economic theory. However, as mentioned in Section 2, mainstream economic theory arbitrarily constrains its analysis by the assumptions it makes to allow for mathematical modeling.
Although this simplification is necessary (and I believe an important scientific process), it
nonetheless limits the questions that can be investigated. In some markets the impact of
deviations from baseline assumptions may be minor and thus their exclusion may be warranted. However, digital markets have potential social impacts well beyond those that can
be validly assumed away. By ignoring these impacts, mainstream analyses fail to truly analyze digital markets, instead analyzing some theoretical market in a vacuum, diminishing
the applicability of the resulting analysis.
One major threat that has arisen with the rise of digital markets is the ability of major
companies to influence the preferences and actions of individuals, and even other companies.
As the scandal with Cambridge Analytica showed, Facebook’s collection of user data can be
used to influence users’ political beliefs.64 As detailed above, Google’s proprietary and secret
algorithm for search results can be adjusted at any time, giving it immense power to influence
64. I take no stand here about whether Cambridge Analytica’s work influenced the 2016 election in substantial ways. Nonetheless, it would seem irrational for Cambridge Analytica to engage in this risky behavior
without expecting it have an impact on the election’s outcome.
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what information is deemed acceptable, or what websites can be easily reached. Amazon’s
control of a major online marketplace, as well as its influence over many other companies
through AWS, is yet another threat that has arisen.65 Lastly, Apple, with a market valuation
larger than the GDP of all but four countries (United States, China, Japan, and Germany),
has been accused of using planned obsolescence to force users to buy newer phones when
they are released,66 as well as forcing developers to pay a 30% commission on all sales on
their platform.
If economic theory can only offer policy makers options that are politically impossible
to implement, economic analysis may be relegated to the academy in favor of more populist
policies, with dire consequences. Thus, the following institutional analysis is my attempt to
further the analysis beyond the theoretical and investigate the potential outcomes of different policy measures. Moreover, I will compare the theoretical predictions to the empirical
evidence and detail potential causes for deviation. Furthermore, I will follow in the footsteps
of institutional greats such as John Maurice Clark, John R. Commons, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Thorstein Veblen by offering some non-standard policy recommendations that
can maximize the benefit to society at lowest cost. In general, this will be a positive analysis, investigating these markets as they are instead of as we assume they should be. This
approach will allow for antitrust authorities to develop policies that can better reach the
outcomes that normative economic theory advocates. However, at times this analysis will
question the normative theories used by the mainstream, mainly due to their ambivalence
or exemption of social aspects when determining the “best” outcome.
65. Not to mention Jeff Bezos’ ownership of the Washington Post, one of the foremost newspapers in the
world.
66. In particular, claims have been made that Apple built code into its iOS updates that would cause
older generation phones to run slower and use more battery when a new generation was released. The
immediate response in 2017 from Apple was to offer battery replacements at lower prices. However,
as of 2021, Apple argues that it slows down old phones to protect the hardware of older phones from
the newer software which is designed for the newest hardware. See https://www.techradar.com/news/
apple-might-be-slowing-down-your-old-iphone-on-purpose.
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5.1

Institutional Response to Mainstream Analysis
One of the first complications that arises when attempting a mainstream analysis of

digital markets is the inability of mainstream theory to explain some empirical regularities
in these markets. The most obvious example may be the case of the drastic price differences
between Apple iPhones and Android phones.67 On average, Android phones are cheaper
than iPhones. It is not an insignificant difference either, as in 2015 the difference was $433
(Chowdhry 2015).68 However, this directly contradicts the theory described above from Shy
(2001). In that theory, Shy shows that, using mainstream assumptions, it should be the
case that the compatible product is priced higher than the incompatible product. Applying
Shy’s theory to this example69 would predict that Android phones would be priced higher.
As mentioned before, switching costs are lower between these phones and thus producers do
not need to subsidize these costs through lower prices. Yet as anyone who has researched
buying a smartphone knows, Android phones have a reputation for being lower priced and
affordable, while Apple iPhones are higher priced.
An institutionalist understanding can illuminate a few major aspects of this market that
Shy ignores, which can help explain this anomaly. One of them is that Apple has developed
a reputation for having high quality and valuable products, which implicitly biases users
towards Apple. Therefore, due to the large option set consumers face for mobile phones, an
impatient consumer will tend towards Apple. Furthermore, this reputational value can have
social benefits for consumers of the product. Those who purchase Apple products might
gain social capital through their purchase, causing these users to value Apple products more
than another product which gives them the same (or more) non-social utility. There is also
evidence that users, especially young ones, have large losses in quality of social interactions
67. A similar distinction in prices arises in computers as well.
68. For context that is roughly the same as a Samsung Galaxy A42 5G phone costs today. Thus, an average
iPhone could be bought for the same amount that at least two average Androids could be bought.
69. We can say Apple is incompatible as its software is only available on Apple produced phones. In
contrast, Android phones are produced by many different manufacturers, which should lower the switching
costs of these more compatible phones.
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if they do not use Apple products. As one University of Michigan student recounted to the
Wall Street Journal, “there definitely was some kind of social pressure to get back to [Apple]”
(Higgins 2022). Apple has attempted to capitalize on this social pressure by making SMS
messages to Android phones green, instead of the blue used by iOS to indicate messages to
another iPhone.70 Although text bubble color is a small detail, the social norm that develops
in a group of iPhone users for blue bubbles can be very strong. Thus, seeing an unexpected
green bubble can cause social backlash, and even decrease the net utility users get from
engaging with that individual. The Android user will then be incentivized to transfer to
the Apple environment if they feel there are enough social costs that can be eliminated by
moving.
This institution developed around Apple helps to explain the high prices that Apple can
charge for its product. Not only has it succeeded in developing a prevailing social view
that its products are high-quality (and thus worthy of a high price), but it has also fostered
the development of major social costs associated with not using its products. Thus, even
though Android may nominally have lower prices than Apple, Android products may have a
greater perceived cost when adjusting for the social stigma associated with their use. With
this institution supporting it, Apple has been able to consistently post gross profit margins
(revenue less costs as a percentage of revenue) of around 40% since the iPhone’s release in
Q3 2007 (see Figure 4).
Another aspect of this institution is its focus on the younger population. Apple’s focus
on locking in young individuals to its platform has a two-fold impact. First, it will increase
the likelihood of Apple holding major market share in the future, as the younger generations
become more prevalent in the population. Secondly, the increased prevalence of these generations over time will increase the prevalence of the associated institution. This increased
70. Apple’s official position is that iMessage (i.e., Apple product to Apple product messaging) is preferred
due to its superior encryption. Although there is no evidence that younger users are preferring iMessage
for that reason, this still does not explain Apple’s use of a different color. Moreover, as recently released
documents show, Apple had an extensive internal debate regarding whether iMessage should be offered to
Android products. Eventually, it was decided it would remain only for Apple products to erect a barrier
locking users in (Higgins 2022).
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Figure 4: Apple Gross Profit Margins 2005-2022 (Statista, n.d.)
institutional presence will, in turn, increase the reconstitution of the institutions through
social conditioning of subsequent generations. With greater prevalence and stability, change
to this institution will be more difficult and, therefore, Apple may continue to hold a hegemonic position, not only in the market for smartphones, but in society. Since mainstream
analyses fail to recognize this role of social influence, they fail to recognize that waiting until
indisputable consumer welfare harm occurs may mean that the underlying institution has
developed to a level at which action may be extremely difficult if not impractical.
For example, if Apple had no antitrust policy for 20 years until it finally caused obvious
social harm, it may be the case that the institution would have developed to a point where
punishing Apple may become politically infeasible or even hurt consumers. Imagine in these
20 years Apple products became more prevalent, along with the social view that Apple was
a uniquely innovative firm. It may be the case that by the time Apple damaged consumer
welfare, consumers were able to convince themselves that Apple was harming their immediate
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welfare to increase their future welfare through a new innovative technology funded through
the extra profits, causing major issues for antitrust authorities. Should they act in the best
interest of the current consumer and potentially threaten the welfare of the future consumer,
or stand idly by and potentially allow the consumers they are supposed to protect be harmed
by Apple’s policies? If the institution was strong enough, it may be that consumers would
prefer no action to action. Although mainstream normative analyses would say that action
that increased consumer welfare is the action that should be done, this ignores the fact that
consumers may see welfare loss from politically unpopular antitrust action even if the theory
would say this increased competition would increase consumer welfare.
5.2

Two-Sided Markets and Negative Prices
Apple, Amazon, Google, and Meta, all have aspects of their business that rely on two-

sided markets. Apple must convince software and application developers to develop on its
platform so that it is attractive to consumers, while simultaneously convincing users to
use the platform so it is attractive to developers. Amazon must convince users that there
are enough vendors and products available on its marketplace to warrant its use, while
also needing to convince vendors there are enough users to validate selling on the platform.
Lastly, Google and Meta must convince advertisers that their audiences constitute a valuable
consumer base, while trying to restrict ads enough to prevent users from abandoning the
platform altogether.
As shown above, mainstream industrial organization theory has developed many theories
that help to explain some of the behavior seen in two-sided markets. However, these theories
often hold that if network effects are large enough, profit-maximizing platforms should subsidize users (i.e., have negative prices). A representative example here would be Google. Since
Google’s PageRank algorithm71 uses the rate of citation from other web pages to determine
71. Although this example will rely mostly on the PageRank algorithm, the actual Google search algorithm
is proprietary and secret. It is known that PageRank has at least some impact in the method, but there are
likely other factors that Google uses that are unable to be audited.
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a certain web page’s ranking, general usage of the internet greatly impacts the algorithm’s
efficacy. Namely, if more users (and consequently more web pages) join the internet, this
algorithm will have greater efficacy. Google thus sees an increase in the value of its search
results when more users use not only Google Search, but the internet as a whole. That is
it sees a large network effect associated with its product. Since Google holds a monopoly
on this two-sided market (with search users on one side and advertisers on the other) and is
profit seeking, it must seek revenue from at least one of the sides. The nearly universal scope
of the user-side network effect means that Google’s product can draw in users relatively
passively. Since the advertisers will value advertising on Google’s platform more as more
users join, and advertising can be seen as a cost to search users, Google will likely (and does)
seek revenue from the advertisers rather than the search users. The extreme nature of the
network effect on search users means, theoretically, Google may maximize profit by offering
a slight subsidy to users for using its platform. However, we see limited evidence of Google
(or any other major site for that matter) using this business model.72
Since we do not see the predicted outcome of the theory in this case, we must investigate
to determine what might be causing these deviations. Since the network effect impacting
Google’s search results is all-encompassing, it is unlikely that this effect is too small for
the theory to support negative prices. Calvano and Polo (2021) show that if the network
effect is positive and strong (as Google’s is) below cost pricing, including negative prices,
may occur.73 Others, such as Gans (2022) have argued that below cost pricing is welfare
maximizing, but that negative pricing is welfare reducing. Instead, I argue that there is an
institution that influences both consumers and producers in this situation that arbitrarily
72. A perceptive reader may point out here that influencers on social media may be a form of negative
prices. I argue instead that this is just a modern form of advertising. The closest example to a user subsidy
is social media companies such as Meta, TikTok, YouTube, and Twitch paying creators to create on and
use their platform. I think this could still be seen as advertising on one’s own platform, however. A true
user subsidy would likely mean a periodic dividend based on the usage level each users had, rather than
influencers who get paid to create content.
73. If Google’s network effect is not large enough to exhibit the behavior described in the theory presented
by Calvano and Polo, it begs the question: why were hypothetical negative prices not mentioned as the
result of an implausible network effect?
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sets zero as a lower bound on price.74 I believe that this arises from three main avenues: i)
price as a signal of quality; ii) the “specialness” of zero prices; and iii) firms being influenced
by outdated institutions regarding business practices.
The lack of profit-increasing negative prices in the Google example is, in part, due to a
social norm of using the price of a good as a signal of its quality.75 In the modern economy,
no consumer has universal knowledge about the product they buy or consume, so many rely
on heuristics (such as those famously described by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky)
to make decisions, one of which is price. If a good is priced highly, it may signal that the
cost and quality of production are higher, and vice versa for low priced goods. With respect
to digital markets, many of the products consumed by users are free (i.e., zero price), so
negative (i.e., lower) prices may be perceived as signaling a lower quality product. Users
may see a subsidy for using Google’s product as a sign that Google does not offer a highquality product and must generate demand for a lesser quality product through this tactic.
Moreover, the impact of price signaling is complicated when prices approach zero. Due to the
aforementioned “specialness” of zero prices, users vastly overvalue free goods when compared
to goods with small positive prices. Thus, this would seem to imply that negative prices
should further increase the demand for a product beyond what a decrease to zero would.
Yet, a simple example can show that this may not be the case. Let us add an additional
hypothetical test to the Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely (2007) candy test. In their original
paper, they offer two candies, originally at 1 cent and 15 cents and subsequently for free and
14 cents, respectively. Now let us assume we decreased prices by 1 cent again, so that prices
74. This differs vastly from Gans (2022) since he argues that zero prices are a anchor price due to “free
disposal”. Through incorporating transaction costs, I show that free disposal does not exist in these markets.
Thus the existence of zero prices must be explained in another way.
75. It is true that credit card rewards are an example of negative prices in other markets. However, this
example does not negate the fact that Google is not behaving in a profit-maximizing way. Although one
could argue that Google might take up negative prices if threatened, and currently just sees no reason to,
there is a major issue, namely that Google, as any firm, is thought to be profit-maximizing. Moreover,
the use of negative prices could hamper future competition even more, as smaller firms would have to offer
negative prices of greater magnitude to convince users to leave Google. Therefore, Google could potentially
increase its profit, while limiting future competition, two actions that are beneficial to a profit-maximizing
firm.
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were -1 cent (i.e., an individual would receive a penny from the researcher) and 13 cents.
Although one may argue that any rational person would be more likely to take the candy
in this final case compared to the second case (of free and 14 cents) because the subsidy
covers some of the potential cost associated with the candy, I doubt this would happen.
In particular, I believe the interplay between price signaling quality and the specialness
of zero prices here is important. The sign switching causes a mental inflection in utility
determination. This causes consumers to actively hypothesize potential costs beyond the
price, while with positive prices they only do this passively. The associated mental cost
associated with thinking about these potential costs decreases the utility that users gain
from the good. This, in turn, decreases their demand for the product. In the candy example,
this would be demonstrated through less candy being taken when individuals would be paid
than when the candy was free. For Google, this means it may not be subsidizing use of its
search product because this lower price could paradoxically decrease demand for its good.76
Another potential reason for the lack of negative prices is that businesses are using pricing
heuristics that have not adjusted to new dynamics apparent in modern markets. As described
in Section 2, institutions take time to develop and adjust to economic and structural changes
and, just as mainstream economic theory is currently in the process of adjusting its theories
to understand the novelty of digital markets, business institutions are adjusting. Basic microeconomic theory has long argued that the optimal (i.e., profit-maximizing) production for
a firm is where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Using this heuristic, most businesses
have been able to successfully achieve nearly maximum profits. However, with the complexity
introduced with digital markets, this rule is no longer universally true. Instead, companies
that are influenced by this out-of-date institution may see the low (or zero) marginal costs
of their digital products and determine that similar levels for price would profit maximize.77
76. This could alternatively described as the reverse of a Veblen good, where demand increases as prices
increase (i.e., upwards sloping demand curve).
77. Thus, in a sense, the societal overconfidence in some simplistic economic theories may be a cause
of the lack of optimal pricing in digital markets. This is especially true when they gain broad societal
implementation as this allows for greater reconstitution of the social norm to align actions with these economic
theories.
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Therefore we are not at a Pareto optimal point, as consumers could receive additional utility
in the form of negative prices, which would, in turn, increase the profits of firms. Gans
(2022) argues that zero prices may be welfare maximizing, while negative prices would result
in overproduction. Although I agree with his theoretical analysis (especially regarding the
potential failure of competition in these markets), he assumes that consumers have “free
disposal” of products. As I have shown, consumers do not have cost-free disposal of digital
goods, evidenced by the existence of switching costs and interpersonal costs, among others.
This means that consumer utility curves are not bounded at zero as Gans assumes.78
5.3

Market Power as Power Over Institutions
Market power for firms in digital markets is not as closely correlated with market share

as in other markets. Data’s ability to offer economies of scope and associated network effects
interact to generate large market power even when market share remains seemingly low. One
major example of this is Amazon. According to eMarketer (2021), Amazon has a market
share of nearly 40% in e-commerce, well below Department of Justice’s de facto threshold
for dominance in a market (i.e., 70%) (Krämer and Wohlfarth 2018). However, since in
digital markets it is harder to determine the quality of a product, Amazon’s power over
the information shown to users grants it more power than a simple retailer would have.
In physical retail stores, such as Walmart, consumers can investigate physical properties of
the product to determine the quality. However, even this limited ability does not exist in
digital markets (Wiseman 2000). The power over information is an underappreciated aspect
of market power that mainstream economic theory ignores in its focus on market share.
78. In particular, Gans argues that consumers “can simply choose not to consume” a good, which would
bound utility at zero (Gans 2022, 160). Although this may be true in many other markets investigated
by economics, with the social prevalence and importance of digital products, this is not the case in digital
markets, such as the evidence regarding social norms around Apple products shows. In this case, consumers
are not able to simply not consume Apple products, since they must also weigh the potential loss of social
connections and other interpersonal losses. They may still decide to not consume, but the utility need not
be bounded by zero. For example, utility from remaining may be -10 utils, while leaving has utility of -8
utils. Thus, even for a rational agent, who would choose to leave, the resulting utility would be below Gans’
proposed lower bound of zero.
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Furthermore, Amazon’s power over information is even more important because it competes with third parties on a marketplace that it owns, meaning it can dictate how and
what information is given to consumers. Since individuals have less ability to investigate the
quality of a product before purchase, they have greater dependence on brand names to act
as a proxy for quality, making brand names in these markets more powerful.79 For example,
a consumer on Amazon may see two equally priced products, one which is Amazon Basics
and the other a small brand. Since Amazon has developed a brand name and the associated
trust of its products, there is an implicit impact on consumer behavior. That is, when consumers face this decision with limited ability to compare the quality of the products, they
will likely see the name brand as the safer option (i.e., the one with a higher expected quality
or utility).
Amazon’s ownership of the marketplace also grants it power to impact the institution
influencing consumers on its site. Since consumers depend heavily on the information that
Amazon offers through recommended products and official lists, Amazon can use this captive
aspect of its users to its advantage. For example, there are active allegations that Amazon
uses the data from third party sales to determine products it should sell. When these
products are determined, Amazon leverages its economies of scale to undercut these thirdparty providers. Since Amazon is a more well-known brand and its products are often
cheaper than competitors, it quickly captures major shares of the market, a trend directly
shown through the below graph (Figure 5) from the House of Representatives investigation
of digital markets. Here it is shown that although Amazon consistently has less than 50%
of the total postings in a good’s market, it has an outsized number of total sales of that
good. Consequently, smaller producers are disincentivized from competing, causing further
concentration in the production of goods. Thus, it can be seen that market ownership, in
contrast to solely market share, allows for large economies of scope. These economies of scope
79. It is true that consumers can read many reviews to help determine the quality of a good. However,
these reviews can be flooded with fake reviews by sellers in an attempt to make their product appear higher
quality. Consumers may respond to this behavior by decreasing their trust in these online reviews, leading
to aforementioned result.
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raise antitrust questions, as ownership of one market can cause major threats to competition
in other markets, especially in digital markets, where extensive user data can lower barriers
to entry into new markets. At the same time, however, these economies of scope can be used
to enter underdeveloped markets. This process can expand and increase the efficiency of
these markets and illuminates a major dilemma: the ownership of markets can both increase
innovation and efficiency, while also threatening competition in other markets.

Figure 5: First Party vs. Third Party Listings and Sales on Amazon (United States House
of Representatives 2020, 276)

5.4

Data as a Business Model
Data has been an important aspect of economies for as long as humanity has sought

to trade goods with one another. Understanding what a customer wants and how much
they are willing to pay for it is an important task for any producer. Companies used to
conduct market surveys to understand how they should design production so as to maximize
their profits. These surveys were nonetheless imperfect for many reasons, not the least of
which was the fact that they often did not have representative groups of their multifaceted
consumers. However, with the recent rise of technological innovation and the growth of “Big
Data,” determining market demand has become less onerous, while simultaneously growing
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in accuracy. Some companies, such as Facebook and Google, have commodified information
and designed their business models around it. A major factor that has shaped the market
structure of digital markets is the interplay between network effects and revenue derived
from consumer data. Furthermore, there are major social welfare costs that are ignored in
this market which, when properly valued, justify government market intervention.
Facebook and Google are two of the most prevalent companies that have grown to prominence with a revenue stream heavily dependent on data. One of the major benefits of this
business model, in terms of profitability, is that data (in contrast to R&D or physical capital) does not easily depreciate (Li, Nirei, and Yamana 2019).80 Furthermore, since data is
non-rival, there is limited need for upfront capital costs or major upkeep costs. This further
creates a beneficial climate for these data-driven business models as there is limited labor
required to create extensive value. Even just merging two previous datasets can generate
extensive value due to the increased accuracy of the data interpolation. Although there are
numerous examples of companies which have grown extensively using this business model,
it is important to note this is not a model that is easily replicable. Data’s value grows
exponentially with its extent, thus companies that already have market power can further
entrench that power through exploiting the highly profitable move to data revenue streams.
As I demonstrated in Section 4, one common way that companies in digital markets increase
profits is by aggressively merging with other companies. This merging of companies allows
for an expansion and extension of data, further increasing its value, while simultaneously protecting the firm from competition. This benefit helps to explain why mergers are extremely
prevalent in digital markets.
These business models also pose a risk of creating adverse incentive structures in the
economy. John Torpey (2020, 752) describes the economy that companies such as Meta and
Google face as the “attention economy,” as these companies benefit when more consumers
80. It is true that data may depreciate in the sense that data on an individual may become out of date.
However, unlike most depreciated goods, depreciated data can lower the cost of analyzing new data. That
is, old data can give a point of reference for more updated data, lowering analysis costs.
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remain on their platform. Within the attention economy, there are incentives for companies
to engage in anti-competitive actions to keep as much of the market for themselves, securing
higher revenues and profits. This is especially prevalent for companies like Meta and Google
which rely heavily on the network effects that are gained the more users their platforms have.
Meta and Google are then incentivized to engulf any competitor under their umbrellas, so
they can expand their profits more. Moreover, since data is likely to be undervalued, it
follows that these mergers benefit the buyer more than the seller (Li, Nirei, and Yamana
2019).81 Thought of another way, this means that Meta and Google can buy a revenue
stream for less than its true value to them, further expanding their profits and likely their
market power as well.
The dependence on data as a business model also means that network effects interact
uniquely in digital markets. Since data’s value increases exponentially with the size of
the dataset, many companies seek to expand their markets as much as possible to gain
valuable data from their consumers. The network effects that are associated with industries
such as search engines and social media websites relate to the size of the user base. With
these industries, the more users there are the more likely users will enjoy their experiences
and return. Meta and Alphabet have these network effects most prominently, but so do
Amazon (e.g., more users imply more informative reviews) and Apple (e.g., more users of
Apple products increase the benefit that users would receive from buying Apple products
in their next purchase decision). Thus, these companies must try to expand their user base
continuously to expand their revenue. For Google and Meta, this has been done through
“voluntary giveaways,” such as Google not charging consumers for their search algorithm, or
Meta not charging users for posting on their sites. According to Jonathan Barnett (2018),
expansion is done to capitalize on network effects in a market or to move revenue streams to
81. This undervaluation of data is due to a similar process to the one that leads to the exponential increase
in data quality and value. When small companies or individuals are viewing their data, the marginal benefit
of a single new datum is relatively less than the marginal benefit that a larger company can gain from that
datum. Thus, one further complication of digital markets is that marginal benefit may not be diminishing
in these markets. When this potential lack of diminishing marginal benefits interacts with the economies of
scale described above, there exist reasons for larger companies to engage in a large number of mergers.
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areas where a company has an advantage over its competitors.82 This push for more network
effects can also be done by continuously seeking to “innovate” in some way. However, unlike
typical markets, the innovation in digital markets is more often related to aggregation and
breadth of information than quality or production (Li, Nirei, and Yamana 2019).83 Unlike
the innovation of other industries, this innovation has much less cost in terms of both R&D
and time. All these aspects can generate a perfect storm for extreme market shares.
Economic theory is typically worried about the higher prices due to monopolies (either
through price setting behavior or production below socially optimal levels), so for companies
such as Google and Facebook, whose market share has been derived from goods with little
to no price to consumers, understanding the social welfare costs is more complicated. As
Li, Nirei, and Yamana (2019, 2) rightly point out, “consumers exchange their personal data
for ‘free’ goods and services,” implying that the notion that these goods are “free” is not
necessarily true. However, this idea expands beyond just those consumers who decide to
“exchange their personal data,” since a company with enough data can make exceptionally
accurate interpolations regarding members of a group who are not even among their data.
Furthermore, although there is no monetary price for using Facebook or Google, there is an
associated opportunity cost: the income one could gain if they owned their data and companies had to pay the individual consumer for it.84 Another potential social cost is the fact that
algorithms for many of the largest social media sites tend to reward content that reinforces
previously held beliefs.85 This has led the sociologist John Torpey to proclaim, “whereas the
original vision of the Internet foresaw a ‘democratization’ of information. . . social media such
82. The latter point here can be understood well through the aforementioned theory of two-sided markets.
If these firms have power over their clients on one side of a market (such as from inelastic demand), these
firms may move revenue generation into the side of the market they have more power over. This would
decrease the risk associated with the revenue stream, while also increasing total profit.
83. This definition of innovation is one that is often overlooked in mainstream analyses. It is true that
innovation here is not necessarily consumer beneficial technology, but it nonetheless allows for increasing
profitability.
84. However, due to the network effects associated with data, this opportunity cost is lower when it is an
individual compared to a group. This may support consumers joining together to collectively own data,
thereby increasing its value.
85. This is another way to entice users to remain on a platform, allowing these sites to collect more
commodifiable data as it limits the cognitive dissonance that users must deal with.
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as Facebook tend to promote tribalism and extremism” (Torpey 2020, 759). Also, the rents
associated with data-based business models, coupled with the non-rival aspect of data, may
lead to overproduction of advertising and data collection, causing inefficiencies and potential
welfare losses (Li, Nirei, and Yamana 2019; Barnett 2018).
If one believes that the welfare costs associated with these companies outweighs the
associated welfare gains, there exists justification for a market intervention in defense of social
welfare. However, as Torpey points out, our current situation may be “path dependent”
(Torpey 2020, 751). This path dependence, according to Antonelli (1997) means that the
state at present is dependent on both the state in the past and how that state has changed
over time. Thus, our current state of data commodification and market concentration is
due to how these companies came about, but more importantly for this analysis, how the
structure of interactions changed over time. The large benefits derived from these products
further mean that any action must determine a way to change society while keeping digital
markets or goods to some extent, potentially supporting actions such as those taken by the
State of California and the European Union in which they have allowed individuals to opt
out of having their data collected (in California’s case) or guaranteed the right of individuals
to their personal information and the ability to demand it be deleted (in the case of the
EU).86 In general, this understanding highlights the complexities associated with regulating
an industry which has created the first companies to reach trillion-dollar market valuations.
Although it may no longer be possible to effectively enact antitrust actions against Big
Tech companies due to their extreme sizes, this does not mean that regulators are out of
options. It does, however, show that, just as companies must innovate to stay ahead of their
competition, antitrust regulators must also innovate to create plans that will generate their
desired outcomes.
The rise of data-based business models and the rise of market power associated with
86. These laws are the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR contains the so-called “right to be forgotten” which allows any user to
demand their data be deleted.
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them has led many to fall back to the familiar response to market power: break it up
through antitrust legislation. However, as detailed above, this recourse may be untenable
due to path dependency of the situation. These modern problems will likely require modern
solutions. Digital technology has undoubtedly brought immense welfare gains to society.
Individuals can now communicate with anyone around the world at the touch of a button,
order food from any local restaurant from their couch, or find information related to almost
any topic imaginable in mere seconds. However, as often happens, these benefits come
with associated costs. By using a social media site such as Facebook or WhatsApp to
communicate with others, consumers give these companies free access to their valuable data.
This transfer of valuable data happens with almost all actions based on the internet. Thus,
understanding the market dynamics at play and the potential social costs associated in
an institutionalist framework necessarily requires economists to understand the reasons why
consumers give companies free access to their valuable information. Furthermore, economists
should also seek to develop ways to protect consumers, and society, from the potential
negative consequences of this market which, to many, may seem solely positive. To be able
to properly engage in this project, economists must first describe in detail the social costs
associated with digital markets.
5.5

Social Costs of Commodified Data
In recent years our society has had to grapple with major questions around how we seek

to exist in a world of commodified data. In this world, companies have such expansive
knowledge about subgroups of people that they can predict behavior even for people who
are excluded from their original dataset. The rise of Big Data and the subsequent market
power associated with it not only causes economic concerns, but also raises many ethical and
social questions. These seemingly non-economic questions must be properly understood to
examine the market dynamics associated with Big Data and their impacts on modern society.
As institutionalists have constantly pointed out, no interaction happens in a vacuum and the
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economic and non-economic factors involved play an integral part in properly understanding
how policy changes can bring the desired outcome. Through investigating these seemingly
non-economic questions, the economic nature of their answers becomes apparent.
To be of any real value, the policy that is offered must be implementable. If economic
theory can only offer theoretical policies that work when individuals are in a vacuum, the
relevance of economic analysis is lessened. If major ethical questions arise in a situation
(such as centralized private caches of personal data), a portion of the population may decide
to ignore their personal utility to support the moral position they believe in.87 Furthermore,
this group’s action may cause other economic actors to rethink their personal classification
of welfare.88 Here, we then see an economic impact from a moral background. Hence, the
focus in this section on understanding those social costs that are not generally viewed as
economic.
Before expanding on the social and ethical issues associated with commodified data and
the companies that capitalize off it the most, it is necessary to understand the ways that
rentiership develops within digital markets. Rentiership is an important aspect to investigate
for these markets, as economics for centuries has focused on how and why certain goods
receive more income than they cost to bring to market. Thus, rentiership could be seen as a
social cost, as it gives firms in digital markets undue social power through the undue economic
power gained through rents. One major differentiating factor for these digital markets is that
the economic rents associated are no longer of the sort investigated by David Ricardo and
early classical economists (such as land or resource rents), but rather are inherent aspects of
87. I recognize that many mainstream economists would likely argue this behavior could be incorporated
into a utility function, as the individual may be gaining utility from the seemingly altruistic action they
are taking (e.g., an individual may be an impure altruist). I grant this valid point, but I believe that the
benefit of the institutionalist focus on transactions illuminates the potential for these non-economic impacts
to influence social institutions. Through this process, they can not only cause tangible impacts to the utility
of the individual in the moment, but over time, change their preferences and, thus, the entire economic
structure of society. Mainstream economics, on the other hand, takes the economic structure as given and
stagnant.
88. Here one can think about how prior to Edward Snowden’s release of information regarding the NSA’s
surveillance of citizens, relatively few citizens worried about their privacy on the internet. Since then,
concerns about privacy have become a major moral and social question regarding digital markets.
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the market (Birch and Cochrane 2022). According to Kean Birch and D.T. Cochrane (2022),
there are four distinct ways that Big Tech companies extract economic rent in their market:
enclave rents, engagement rents, expected monopoly rents, and reflexivity rents. Some of
these, such as enclave rents (which are derived from ownership of an ecosystem of use, such
as a platform or market, thus directing all revenues through the company) and engagement
rents (where algorithms allow for discrimination of consumers) have already been explained
above, so I will focus on the latter two. Expected monopoly rents arise when investors believe
that the high market share of a company will lead to higher future revenues and profits. This
feedback loop allows for these companies to access capital more cheaply, allowing for easier
merging with smaller competitors (Birch and Cochrane 2022, 7). The access to cheap capital
has a related impact on the market: a decrease in investment in potential competitors, since
investors see little chance of generating a return on investment. Reflexivity rents, on the
other hand, arise when companies leverage their control over algorithms to exploit either
consumers or other companies seeking to exist within the algorithm’s sphere of influence
(Birch and Cochrane 2022, 9–10). This control can generate rents by warping information
dissemination in favor of the algorithm’s owner, pushing disproportionate levels of revenue
to this firm.
These reflexivity rents are particularly emblematic of the market structure, as they show
that in these markets, even if a monopoly is not formally a price-setter, it has the potential to
distort, and even eliminate, effective competition.89 This power over information incentivizes
firms to pay for high placement in secretive algorithms, leading to a self-selection of highly
capitalized firms, causing concentration in digital markets to develop tendencies towards
concentration in every other market. Concentration has given rise to another worrisome
aspect: the privatization of previously publicly funded research and innovation (Apostolicas
2019). At first glance, calling privatization of research worrisome may appear contradictory
89. Take for example, Amazon Basics. Since Amazon owns the marketplace it competes on, and thus has
control over the search algorithm for the site, it can push users towards Amazon Basics products. When
this is combined with Amazon gleaning information about what products to produce from the information
gained from the marketplace ownership, the potential for anti-competitive behavior is obvious.
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to much of economic theory,90 but understanding the history of the technology market puts
this in proper perspective. Many of these companies developed from technologies initially
funded by government money, such as Google’s search algorithm (funded by the National
Science Foundation), Apple’s SIRI, touch-screen technology, and the Internet as a whole (all
funded, at least in part, by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) or its successor
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)).91 Since technology innovation
requires such large upfront spending to develop working prototypes (not including the cost
of bringing a good to market, if possible), the government has historically played a major
role as an entity that is able to invest without requiring profitability. Instead, the government could invest with a focus on technology it deemed beneficial, such as military projects
(as many of these innovations began). However, with private companies such as Google
and Microsoft innovating independently of government funding (take, for example, quantum computing), there is a risk that government-funded innovation may stall as politicians
prioritizing spending in other areas (or reducing it on the whole) might argue that private
companies have picked up enough of the slack to allow the government’s role to shrink.
Without government-funded innovation to lower the barriers to entry for competitors, these
markets may see innovation steadily engulfed by massive corporations. By having greater
government funding of innovation, there is less profit-incentivized innovation (which may
have above optimal levels of risk aversion) and greater overall social benefit.
Beyond just the concerns regarding economic competition, the rise of private innovation
in areas formerly driven by government research has led some to worry about the threats
this has on national security. Although some tech executives (typically Americans) tend to
argue that their market power counters that of belligerent nations such as China,92 there
90. As economic theory typically hypothesizes that private markets more efficiently distribute investment.
91. For more information on this and the history of government funded innovation, see Mariana Mazzucato’s
book The Entrepreneurial State.
92. This is in reference to major Chinese competitors in similar markets, such as Alibaba (similar to
Amazon), Baidu (similar to Google), Tencent (similar to Meta), and Huawei (similar to Apple). As mentioned
above in Section 3, China has banned Google and Meta, while Amazon and Apple have limited market
penetration. Thus, these executives seem to be arguing if they were not the ones with market power
in Western countries, Chinese state-owned businesses would be. This situation raises many geopolitical
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is a parallel argument that their market power stifles innovation, potentially harming the
US more than the associated benefit from protection (Sitaraman 2020). Furthermore, in
a geopolitical sense, the domicile of a company does not necessarily give any information
about their political leanings (take, for example, Google’s use of an Irish domicile to dodge
corporate taxes in the US, while most associate Google with Silicon Valley in Northern
California). In our current economic framework, it is more likely that these major companies
are beholden more to the profit motive and growth prospects than the countries they are
physically located.
Furthermore, the rising concentration in digital markets causes national security issues
since many of the modern tools for national information security are privately produced,
causing governments to become beholden to private interests guided by the profit motive
(Sitaraman 2020). Like the military-industrial complex President Eisenhower warned of, one
could term this the “military-technological complex” of the 21st century. Some have argued
this dynamic situates these Big Tech companies (or so called “silicon states”) as modernday mercenaries, especially when it comes to their development of quantum computing,
which has the potential to be used as a cyberweapon in the future. Also, the attempts by
tech companies to introduce new, potentially viable cryptocurrencies (such as Meta’s Libra)
threaten the hegemony of Western central banks and the use of monetary policy (Apostolicas
2019, 20–21).
There are also extensive social concerns associated with the rise of Big Data, technology
monopolies, and social media as a major organ of political expression, especially regarding
its effects on democracy. As the 2016 election and the fallout of the Cambridge Analytica
scandal showed, data can be used to manipulate democratic institutions, when in the hand
of opportunists. One of the major issues seen in the 2016 election cycle was the rise of
extensive fake news93 and how the Facebook algorithm allowed these stories to gain levels
concerns for Western nations.
93. Here I use the definition from Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) which classifies “fake news” as news that
is blatantly false, such as a misquotation of a real speech, satire articles pushed as fact, and the like.
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of viewership on par with mainstream news agencies (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017, 211–
212). It should be noted that it is likely, due to the extreme levels of information many in
today’s world must grapple with daily, that individuals hold habits which subconsciously
give more value to stories that are highly shared to lessen the cognitive load associated with
engaging with news, causing these fake news stories (regardless of how obviously fake they
may be) to be perceived as real to some. Furthermore, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) show
that, on average, each person in their study remembered roughly one fake news story, which
potentially influenced the outcome of the election. Even if it did not impact the election itself,
the spreading of fake news has eroded the trust of many in news agencies, a trend that can be
exacerbated by the lower barriers to entry associated with digital media compared to print
media. With easier entrance into the news market, already tight margins are decreasing and
the total number of sites with limited trustworthiness is increasing.94 This trend is a distinct
issue from that of “yellow journalism” at the end of the 19th century, since the push for
sensationalism is not necessarily just to entice individuals to purchase their magazine (as it
predominantly was in “yellow journalism”), but is now also influenced by the catered nature
of what individuals see on the internet. That is to say that algorithms in digital markets
have become an influential factor in the proliferation of misleading or false information.
Many commentators have also pointed out how algorithms that give users the “best” user
experience rely on boosting the posts that others share, leading to these same stories being
pushed by these companies.95 Since the inherently political sphere of social media has been
commodified by seemingly apolitical companies,96 some have argued that the way to fix this
94. This is solely a mathematical statement, since assuming the same ratio of trustworthy to nontrustworthy sites with a total increase in sites would say both types increased. I think it is more likely
that less trustworthy sites are more prevalent in the new sites, due to the push for traffic over accuracy
described prior. Regardless, sites which lack trustworthiness are increasing in number.
95. For one such example of an algorithm that does this, see the description of PageRank in Section 3.
96. This is different than news agencies which have opinion sections because the political nature of these
agencies are typically well known. There are also many editors that must approve an opinion piece being
published in a newspaper. This social position as a platform for political discussion makes these agencies
necessarily political, as they often accept. However, social media companies have engaged in similar editing
practices (if one classifies removing “misinformation” as editing) yet seek to appear apolitical. If these
companies are engaging in the inherently political action of censoring and labelling false information (however
reasonable it may be), it is unreasonable to view them as still apolitical bodies.
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issue involves changing the factors that allow views to be manipulated in the first place. For
example, instead of breaking up these companies or forcing them to operate more like news
agencies in terms of journalistic integrity, some have argued that we should foster visibly
political “middleware” which allows consumers to tailor the news they receive to their own
tastes, whether they be truth, support of certain causes, or others (Fukuyama, Richman,
and Goel 2021).
Beyond social and geopolitical concerns of concentration in digital markets, there exist
more general philosophical and ethical questions. One of the first ethical questions is one
that capitalism has constantly faced: is it morally acceptable to have five companies with
market capitalizations over the $1 trillion (most having only 100,000 employees), while only
16 countries (each with tens of millions of citizens) have GDPs over the same benchmark?
Although it is true that GDP and market capitalization are not the same, this dichotomy depicts the issue of major economic and social power consolidated in relatively small companies
with no democratic oversight. There have also been many questions regarding the role of Big
Data with respect to privacy. As mentioned above, there is no way for an individual to gain
true privacy from companies that have enough data. This fact has led some philosophers to
argue that privacy should be viewed not as an individual right but a collective right.
A related ethical question, and one that relates directly to economic theory, is whether
informed consent is taking place in these markets (Richterich 2018). It is important to
know whether individuals are fully understanding the costs associated with commodfied
data, that is, whether there is informed consent in these interactions. There is evidence that
users of these sites are either unaware of the costs or have no alternative. As mentioned
above, there are extensive social costs and privacy concerns in digital markets, but many
did not know about them before Edward Snowden showed the world. Furthermore, in some
instances, users may have to accept major costs because there is no way to avoid them. One
example of this is internet “cookies”. When a user goes on a website, many sites download
small software packets, called “cookies”, on the user’s computer. These cookies allow the
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site to track the user across other sites and optimize performance of the site, among other
tasks. However, when websites offer users the ability to change their cookies preferences,
they often have “required” cookies, which a user cannot disable if they seek to use the site.
Although this is typically viewed as a right of private businesses, when major social platforms
such as job boards and news sites, engage in these behaviors, it begins to have a broader
social impact. Namely, this practice may discriminate against users with different privacy
preferences, which, in turn, could force these users to sacrifice their welfare to remain a part
of the broader society.
However, it would be wrong to claim that these markets and products have only caused
costs to society. It is clear that Amazon’s extensive marketplace has made it easier to buy
any product one could imagine. Meta’s platforms, such as Instagram and Facebook, have
allowed people around the world stay in touch with the push of a button. Google’s search
engine, YouTube, and other products have put the world’s knowledge at the fingertips of
anyone with an internet connection. Apple’s innovation and marketing of the smartphone
has connected the world in ways nobody could imagine even 30 years ago.97 The size of these
companies has also given immense benefits to society, such as Amazon lowering the search
costs for consumers or Meta’s immense size lowering the costs to users from multihoming
in social media, while keeping network size constant. Algorithms that show individuals
their preferred viewpoints and information, although socially harmful in some ways, can
also foster digital communities of like-minded individuals. These algorithms can show users
ads for products they would enjoy but might not know about.98 Moreover, data’s use in
elections can offer greater understanding of the true political views of the citizenry, making
for a stronger and more truly representative democracy.99 Even issues such as data collection
have major potential benefits, from offering the ability to track close contacts with infected
97. For example, the project that sent man to the Moon had less computing power than a modern day
iPhone has.
98. This assumes that preferences of consumers are not influenced by the advertisements that they see.
99. I admit this assumes that politicians at least partially seek to advocate the policies their constituents
support. Since this is the world we wish to live in and these are hypothetical benefits, I believe it is fair.
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individuals during the COVID-19 outbreak to allowing doctors and physicians to collect
large amounts of data to better understand side effects of drugs.
This description of the social costs associated with digital markets was done to show
the reader the costs that are overlooked when benefiting from the products of these companies. Nonetheless, any analysis of digital markets would be incomplete if it did not at
least acknowledge the extensive benefits these markets and products have brought society.
These benefits must be weighed with the costs, and any actions taken must be understood
both with respect to their ability to mitigate costs, but also in their impact on the extensive
benefits associated with these markets.
5.6

Summary of Section
• An understanding of the social institutions influencing digital markets can help to
explain the divergence from theoretical outcomes seen in these markets.
• A complex interaction of social norms and behavioral traits can help to explain why
companies that might theoretically increase profit through consumer subsidies do not
engage in this behavior.
• In digital markets, market power may be better understood as the power to influence
and dictate institutional development and change. This power gives these companies
unprecedented influence over the preferences of their consumers.
• Incentives inherent in digital markets push companies towards consolidation and concentration.
• Although many goods from digital companies are of nominal price of zero, they do
not come without cost. This shadow price is difficult for consumers to incorporate
into decision making, especially when monetary prices are zero. This leads to overconsumption of these products, due to consumers not internalizing costs.
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• The rise of digital companies and the major benefits associated with them makes
our situation path dependent. It is impossible to return to a world without digital
companies, and the trends towards concentration inherent to the markets are difficult
to change.
• There are four forms of rent that are unique to digital markets: enclave rents, engagement rents, expected monopoly rents, and reflexivity rents. These rents interact with
the market dynamics to further push these markets towards concentration.
• The push towards concentration extends to other markets as well due to the ubiquitous
nature of digital markets today.
• Digital companies come with a host of social costs, which must be incorporated into
an economic analysis. These costs range from the geopolitical to the ethical.
• There are major political impacts from allowing digital markets to continue their drive
towards concentration. The greater the economic power of these companies, the more
social and political power they will have. This power threatens democracy, equality of
opportunity, and many of the meritocratic ideals of our society.

6

What is the Role of Antitrust?
Although antitrust authorities currently base decisions solely on a consumer welfare stan-

dard, there is no normative or economic reason that this standard must be the only way.
Even those who have argued that consumer welfare was the proper standard have acquiesced
that other goals are reasonable, albeit difficult to directly target. However, as I have shown,
consumer welfare in digital markets has become difficult to ascertain as well. Therefore, the
role of antitrust policy in relation to digital markets needs rethinking and reformulation for
the modern world. It may be that a consumer welfare standard was efficient and beneficial
in the past non-digital economy, but in our complex digitized world, the consumer welfare
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standard may place too high a burden of proof on antitrust agencies. Doing this may inadvertently allow exactly that which antitrust agencies are supposed to stop: the rise of trusts
and correlated market power.
6.1

Antitrust as a Social Tool
With the rise of the technology age, our society has seen digital markets grow rapidly,

with a simultaneous trend toward concentration. There is evidence that this concentration
has the power to not only impact society through the technology market, but that it can cause
other dependent markets to similarly become more concentrated. These trends are like those
that sparked the development of the foundational antitrust statutes of American antitrust
law: the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914). During this
time, American economics was heavily influenced by the institutional school of economics,
with many of the major voices impacting the drafting and implementation of these new laws
(Panhans and Schumacher 2021). In our modern world, we are seeing many trends from the
late 19th to early 20th century return: rising inequality, increasing market concentration,
and public fears around the power of private firms. For this reason, we should look back to
our predecessors and learn from both their successes and failures to develop our approach to
our modern situation. The market power of Big Tech companies (such as Google, Facebook,
Amazon, etc.) is like that of Standard Oil immediately before it was dissolved under the
Sherman Antitrust Act, at least in sheer size. However, these companies have important
social and political power that make their position different in many ways. For one, many
of these companies are not universal pariahs like Standard Oil, but instead, heralded as the
companies bringing some of the most impressive new innovations to market. Thus, we should
learn from how our predecessors approached the breaking up of Standard Oil with caution.
Expecting the same actions to work in today’s world is foolish, not only because our world
is more complicated than the early 20th century was, but because the power of these modern
companies has different underlying causes and impacts than Standard Oil’s. Using this new
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knowledge, we can create a new antitrust blueprint for the modern day that can best achieve
our desired societal goals.
One of the fears brought up with Big Tech and the rise of targeted advertising is that
companies will begin to choose what we will buy and want solely by impacting what we see.
However, this fear ignores the fact that this is what corporate advertising has done for decades
with Hodgson (2003) arguing companies have used everything from subliminal messaging to
sexual images to make consumers want their product more. Since digital companies have
developed power over the information users can see, the power of advertising to influence
consumer preferences has grown. Geoffrey Hodgson points out how psychology has shown
that in our overly complex world today, we require outside ideas to act as a structure for our
own ideas of rationality (Hodgson 2003). Thus, when companies begin to control information
and determine what views are acceptable, they can influence how consumers determine their
own rationality.
Suppose a company decided to donate money to enough politicians to effectively block
antitrust action for an extended period.100 It then could be that for years action is stifled
for no other reason than the lobbying of this company. Then suppose some years later this
company becomes even larger, and individuals finally begin to recognize the issues associated
with this market power. If they have been told for years that action against this company is
untenable or impossible, they will be much less likely to seek direct action and instead might
tinker around the edges. Although these actions may still lead to some welfare gain, they
would not be the optimal choice as the main issue itself is not addressed. Thus, allowing large
technology companies to obtain massive market power, which then translates into political
power, threatens not only the competitive aspects of the market, but the potential for the
regulator to act in the future. However, the reverse is also true: action today (even if it is
unsuccessful) can lead to more action in the future, which increases the chances of positive
100. For the sake of this argument, I use political donations (which are legal) compared to bribes (which are
illegal), but it seems apparent that any politician dependent on campaign donations likely is in some way
beholden to what their financial backers want.

90

social outcomes.
Beyond just the strictly theoretical fears associated with market power, there are major
concerns facing our society today that can be shown empirically. Firstly, although Meta is
already one of the biggest firms in the world today, it has relatively little penetration into
the largest continental market, Asia, with only 26% of the total population using Facebook
as well as only 19% of Africa having a Facebook account (Statista 2021). Although this data
is likely heavily impacted by the banning of Facebook in China and the limited access to
the necessary hardware in Africa, it shows that Meta still has room to grow. On a global
level, Meta has nearly 46% of the world population on at least one of its platforms, while
roughly 35% of the world has a Facebook account, showing that growth potential for Meta
still exists (Statista 2021; Meta Platforms Inc. 2021). This further means that the market
power will likely not be subdued by increasing acquisition costs associated with higher levels
of penetration for some time. Another interesting trend surrounding Meta has been the
steady increase in revenue per user over the past decade (see Figure 6), a trend directly tied
to advertising revenue since this makes up 98% of Meta’s total revenue (Meta Platforms
Inc. 2021). Thus, not only is Meta increasing its user base consistently, but it is capitalizing
more on those users, likely due to the associated network effects from the increase in users.
This rise in market power is like Standard Oil’s growth at the turn of the 19th century, as
shown through evidence in popular newspapers at the time. As early as 1881, competitors
were discussing the possibility of grouping together to protect themselves from the power
of Standard Oil (The New York Times 1881). By 1889, there was evidence that Standard
Oil was attempting to create a horizontal monopoly, as it was thwarted in its attempt to
build massive private docks for shipping its oil to Long Island (The New York Times 1889a).
Similarly, to many major tech companies responding to calls for antitrust action today,
Standard Oil argued that this action was mutually beneficial to the company and the state.
Simultaneously, competitors were beginning to sue for equality of rates on railroads that
had been pressured by Standard Oil The New York Times (1889b), drawing parallels to the
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Figure 6: Meta Platforms Average Revenue Per User (Statista 2022)

Figure 7: Facebook Monthly Active Users Over Time (Statista 2022)
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rise of backlash that Apple’s App Store commission has brought from some app developers
. There is also evidence from the past that the power of a company stifles criticism and
competition in related markets. For example, Standard Oil’s power caused railroads (which
were used to ship oil to refineries as well as to final destinations) to support Standard Oil as
it was their largest client (The New York Times 1896).101 Even before the famous break up
of Standard Oil in 1911, there was an earlier attempt in Ohio. In this case, they let Standard
Oil do the breakup itself, which led to major delays and eventually John D. Rockefeller was
questioned as to why the firm was still together (The New York Times 1898).
As can be seen, many of the same issues facing society with the rise of Big Tech monopolies
were seen over the years with Standard Oil. However, unlike in Standard Oil’s situation,
the world today has changed drastically. Information travels across the country, not in days
or hours, but in microseconds. It took 41 years from the establishment of Standard Oil
for it to be deemed a trust and broken up under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Companies
under the same scrutiny today like Amazon, Meta, and Google are all younger than this.
However, as shown with archival evidence, these same questions were raised about Standard
Oil at around the same time in its development. Although Standard Oil was first publicly
declared a trust by The New York Times in 1881, only 11 years after it was established, it
took another 30 years for antitrust authorities to finally take major action. The coronavirus
pandemic and the associated movement of many social interactions into digital spheres has
shown vividly the impact that some digital companies have on the day-to-day life of people
in our world today, including many of the negative impacts. If we let them run free without
any countervailing pressure, we risk these problems getting too extreme for any real change
to be done.
Although recognizing an issue is an important task, it is not the whole job. We must
also understand the pros and cons of remedies and if possible, develop an approach that
will maximize the benefits while minimizing the costs to society. The typical reactions
101. It is also true that by 1903 Standard Oil, or its major shareholders, were also major shareholders in
many railroads.
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by antitrust authorities to break up and increase competition is unlikely to be optimal in
this scenario, as has been shown there are network effects and incentives to concentration
which might lead this competition to be short-lived. Furthermore, as mentioned above,
the market dynamics of technology include high upfront research costs (both pecuniary and
opportunity) as well as extreme economies of scale. These dynamics will lead an increase in
competition to most likely harm the smallest companies primarily, while minimally impacting
the largest firms which are the real targets. Another more nuanced and directed policy would
be Paul Romer’s (2021) pitch to tax digital advertising revenues. This strategy is better
than litigating antitrust cases because the lengthy litigations would allow for market power
to be utilized to expand revenue and foil the ongoing litigation. Instead, this would be an
immediate progressive marginal tax on the revenue from digital advertising. This would be
better than an income tax as it would limit the ability of companies to use clever accounting
to get around paying the tax. Some might argue that this tax scheme would disincentivize
gleaning revenue from these streams, but that is what Romer argues this tax should do
(Romer 2021).
Romer’s policy, however, fails to acknowledge some important aspects of digital markets.
Although he shows that companies can utilize subscription services, he ignores that these
companies use subscriptions that enhance user experiences, while simultaneously profiting on
the data generated from the consumer. Also, Romer ignores the results shown by Matthew
Rabin (1998) that consumers are more sensitive to relative changes in prices than the absolute
level. This would mean that consumers who are suddenly required to pay for goods that
they formerly received for no (nominal) price would likely feel a welfare loss.102
Across the political spectrum, there have been calls for the nationalization of these companies, from the Marxist economist Rob Larson (2020) and socialist political scientist James
Muldoon (2020), to the former Trump campaign manager and Cambridge Analytica cofounder Steve Bannon, while Republican senator Josh Hawley goes as far as to ask whether
102. See also the above description of the specialness of zero-price.
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they should exist at all (Nguyen 2018; Allan Smith 2019). Although those in support of nationalization argue that this action would place society in control of the way individual’s data
will be used, rather than private companies, this option fails to alleviate many of the ethical
concerns and raises many others. For one, if social media and internet search are influenced
by algorithms that push users to see information that corroborates their pre-existing beliefs,
nationalized versions might instead censor information and viewpoints that are harmful to
the continual power of the government.103 Moreover, while private conglomerations of personal data are worrisome, it is not clear that governmental control of these data would be
less worrisome. It may even be more worrisome as the NSA’s spying on citizens has shown.
Thus, even the seemingly simple action of giving the control of data conglomeration to the
government is wrought with ethical issues and thus negative economic impacts.
As many issues in our world, there is no perfect response to the question of Big Tech
companies and how to handle the market concentration seen in recent years. Important
information can be gleaned from the delayed action on Standard Oil and its resulting impacts
as a model of a future we might see if we take a similar approach. There are many previous
approaches but as any institutionalist would say, we must design our policy to the unique
market characteristics of our target. Thus, learning from past actions can help us design
new policies, but we should not expect that a prior action is necessarily the best for today’s
situation. We must see the threat posed by Big Tech and respond by developing our own
countervailing threat to Big Tech. Only with countervailing power can we dismantle the
power structure that these companies have developed.
In recent years there has been a visible increase in calls for antitrust action against the
so-called “Big Four” technology companies: Amazon, Google/Alphabet, Facebook/Meta,
and Apple. This has led some to call this economic age the “Second Gilded Age,” hear103. Examples of this include many claims made regarding China’s state involvement in domestic companies.
One such example is that when Google sought to enter China’s market, the government required it censor
certain topics to meet the standards of the so-called “Great Firewall”. This eventually led to an internal
backlash at Google against this policy and Google’s eventual ending of its Chinese subsidiary. See https:
//www.technologyreview.com/2018/12/19/138307/how-google-took-on-china-and-lost/
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kening back to the original Gilded Age of the early 20th century, with major trusts such as
Standard Oil. The Gilded Age saw the development of modern antitrust policy, and many
hope to see modern technology companies go the way of Standard Oil: broken up by government action. However, due to idiosyncratic aspects of the market structures and business
models, the Big Four are different from the monopolies for which the current antitrust law is
designed. By investigating how regulators approached prior accusations of monopoly power
and where their actions could have been improved, the understanding of policy remedies for
modern issues is enhanced. This process can be assisted by using theoretical explanations of
monopoly power, such as Frank Knight’s, to classify when action is beneficial or not.
It would first be important to describe the concerns that have been raised regarding the
individual firms among the Big Four. Apple, for example, has been the subject of a recent
lawsuit from Epic Games to limit Apple’s ability to take commissions from sales on its iOS
App Store. This is antitrust in nature because Apple restricts the access of third-party app
developers to their software unless they pledge to sell their app through Apple’s proprietary
App Store (Surowiecki 2021). This case not only impacts Apple, but might also Google,
Microsoft, and other operating system developers. Like Apple, Amazon has come under fire
due to their Marketplace. This unique business model, which has been immensely profitable
for Amazon, is unlike typical online sales because Amazon allows third-party vendors to sell
on their site, while simultaneously selling their own products. This has led some to worry
that Amazon has warped the search algorithm on their site to further benefit itself. For
example, some argue that Amazon incentivizes advertisement on their site by offering higher
placement in search results, as well as using sales data to mimic top performing products from
competitors (Surowiecki 2021). Unlike Apple and Amazon, the fears around Google are more
reminiscent of the fears that led to the breakup of Standard Oil. The major threat posed
by Google is their near complete domination of the search engine market, to the point their
name is now synonymous with using a search engine. As of 2021, over 90% of internet search
go through Google, meaning that many companies are highly dependent on how Google’s
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search algorithm ranks them.104 The last of the “Big Four,” and the one which Surowiecki
claims is most likely to see antitrust action soon, is Facebook (or, as of October 2021, Meta).
The main fears regarding Meta come from obvious instances of copying competitors (such
as Snapchat’s Stories feature) as well as anti-competitive mergers (such as the purchases of
WhatsApp and Instagram), which has led to Meta-owned properties accounting for over 60%
of social media usage (Surowiecki 2021). Thus, Meta and Google are more closely related to
the historical use of antitrust law, which focused on market power, compared to Apple and
Amazon, which both hold less than 50% of any of their major markets.
The concerns surrounding Amazon and Apple are novel ones that have arisen through
the rise of technology and digital markets, however the concerns about Google and Facebook
are like those that antitrust policy has consistently approached. Thus, it would be useful
to investigate some of the lessons gleaned from past antitrust actions (or inaction). One
of the main aspects that we have seen develop in antitrust, and society as whole, is the
granting of legal personhood to corporations,105 and the associated protections (especially
around privacy). This has greatly limited the scope of antitrust lawsuits, as they have relied
heavily on economic indicators to prove “anti-competitive” actions (Edwards 1975, 346–348).
Furthermore, issues arise as these illegal actions can best be proven through hard to obtain
internal communique, instead of solely economic markers.106 According to Corwin Edwards
(1975), understanding the history of antitrust action shows how static antitrust laws limit the
ability of regulators to adjust to evolving market dynamics. We have evidence, even back in
1975, that limiting mergers, and forcing companies to show social welfare gain to the merger,
is a way to limit growth of market share. Moreover, this can protect the efficacy of antitrust
action, as larger companies result in longer, more expensive, and less guaranteed litigations.
The breadth of a company is important as well, as even if companies do not necessarily have
104. Here one should remember the joke “the cure to cancer might be on the second page of results, but we
would never know”.
105. This is embodied best in the Citizens United Supreme Court case.
106. This has led to the rise of the Chicago School of antitrust since the typical economic markers are most
dependent on price setting power, rather than market power or share. Thus, this political decision has tied
the hands of antitrust action.
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extreme market power in any one market, they can have better vertical integration, allowing
for easier entrance into new markets, as well as the social power derived from extreme size
(Edwards 1975).
To properly understand the complete consequences of any policy, it will be important
to understand what we have learned from the past, but it is also important to develop a
theory of monopoly and whether there is theoretical support for focus on market share. One
important theoretical aspect of monopoly is that beyond the typical focuses on frictions
or economic barriers to entry, there might exist institutions that restrict competition in a
market. Knight (1921) expands on this idea by saying that these institutions can allow for
the development of a sort of “coercive power” that restricts the market as cited in (Salerno,
Dorobat, and McCaffrey 2021, 6–7). This point is nuanced as it does not assume that a
company’s market share necessarily grants them monopoly rents. For example, Knight’s
argument disagrees that the typical notions of the genesis of monopoly rents come from the
ability to restrict output (Knight 1921). This is because a company, even if they control a
significant share of the market, will have some sort of potential competition. This potential competition, however, can be limited or restricted by the “coercive power” mentioned
above. For example, this competition could be restricted by institutional barriers. Here
Knight makes the distinction between barriers that result from natural barriers to supply
and potential competition (e.g., natural monopolies). Since natural barriers are included in
free competition, there would be no way to distinguish the monopoly gains associated with
these barriers. However, when coercive power is expressed (actively or passively), monopoly
gains can be recognized (Salerno, Dorobat, and McCaffrey 2021).
This understanding of the theoretical foundations of monopoly (the target of antitrust
policy) will help antitrust authorities to see where monopoly rents are existing without extreme market share. As detailed earlier, the market structure of these technology companies,
which depend heavily on data and the associated network effects, develops institutional barriers to potential competition. This lack of potential competition can allow for monopoly
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rents to develop as companies begin to have price-setting power, without having to consider
the potential of a competitor entering at a lower price. However, in another sense, these
technology companies are like natural monopolies as it is inefficient to compete due to the
extreme economies of scale associated with data-based revenue streams. Thus, Knight’s theory does not give a definitive answer to the general question, but it can allow us to better
understand the way antitrust action can be argued for individual cases.
Take for example Amazon. As mentioned above, Amazon’s Marketplace is one of their
most profitable endeavors, but even though the company is nearly synonymous with online
retail, they do not control most of the market and are below Walmart’s revenue in total retail
sales (Surowiecki 2021). However, Knight’s theory allows us to see how Amazon could still
be generating monopoly rents in this instance. Since Amazon holds power over their online
marketplace , Amazon has a coercive power (even if it is not always exercised). Furthermore,
it could be argued this is no longer truly free competition because there exists an institutional
barrier to complete competition. One example of this barrier might be that competitors
fear that speaking out against Amazon’s power might hurt their performance on Amazon’s
platform, leading to limitations on what competition might exist. It should be noted that
this type of monopoly rents has seen attention from President Biden’s administration, as a
recent executive order encouraged the FTC to develop rules to limit the power of marketplace
owners to engage in anti-competitive practices (Office of the President 2021).
As mentioned earlier, antitrust has drifted over the past century to focus on solely economic factors, leading to institutional aspects being ignored. This not only limits the power
of antitrust law to enact social changes, but as shown through Frank Knight’s monopoly
theory, it might also limit our ability to truly understand where monopoly rents exist. Earlier discussion has mentioned how focusing on market share or prices can cause myopia in
determining the monopoly rents associated with companies. This discussion expands this
to show that ignoring institutional constraints can blind regulators to the true nature of
monopoly rents in the economy. This further shows why antitrust should not be a solely
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economic determination, but should consider the social interactions involved, thus returning
to its institutionalist roots.
As mentioned above, digital markets have a nuanced impact on society, with both major
costs and benefits. The impacts of digital markets on society are multi-faceted and to
expect a blanket action such as “breaking them up” to maximize social welfare is naı̈ve.
When transactions are properly understood, the impacts of antitrust action will be better
understood in turn. Through understanding the real-world rather than a theoretical one,
antitrust agencies can better design policy for specific markets. Just as economics has long
heralded the division of labor and specialization as efficiency enhancing, the customization
of antitrust policies for specific markets and the specific nature of those markets will enhance
efficiency as well as social welfare.
6.2

Summary of Section
• Antitrust action can be a social tool as well as an economic one.
• The knowledge gained from the rise of Standard Oil in the early 20th century offers an
understanding of the trajectory of digital markets.
• Many of the current policy recommendations see the social threats associated with
digital market concentration, but fail to acknowledge the social threats associated with
their proposed policies (e.g., how socialization of digital companies does not alleviate
the fear of data centralization and may actually exacerbate it).
• Since blatant anti-competitive actions are rare, I offer Frank Knight’s theory of monopoly
as a theoretical understanding of when non-optimal concentration exists. The application of Knight’s theories teach us that when companies hold coercive power, monopoly
rents exist.
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7

Conclusion
This thesis has investigated a topic that is of interest to many economists, so many may

wonder where this thesis differs from the countless reports on digital markets currently. The
main differentiating factors are the approach I take to analyzing behavior and my policy
recommendations. Through analyzing these markets I have not only described the consumer
and firm behavior seen, but also offered novel explanations for these developments that focus
on the power of institutions. Many prior investigations, such as the University of Chicago’s
Stigler Center report from 2019, focus heavily on offering ways to reintroduce competition
into these markets (Stigler Center 2019). This focus on reintroducing competition implicitly sees competition as the best option. However, as I have shown in this thesis, these
markets have inherent trends towards concentration that make any competition transitory
at best, meaning competition policy needs another option. Instead, my policy offerings are
more comprehensive and seek to rearrange the institutional dynamics that have led to the
large conglomerations of power seen in tech companies. Furthermore, my analysis of these
markets has not stopped at pointing out behaviors that support the concentration of these
markets, instead seeking to explain these behaviors. This explanation helps to show antitrust
authorities what policies are best at targeting the underlying issues at play.
Digital markets are bound to change everything about our society, if they have not
already done so. From commerce to information sharing, from social interactions to running
a business, the ubiquitous nature of digital markets has permeated nearly all of society.
Everything from shirts to jobs are found on the internet. But these digital marketplaces are
extremely concentrated. Nearly 90% of internet searches run through Google. Nearly half
of the world’s population (excluding China) has an account on a Meta owned social media
platform. Amazon has developed into the predominant online marketplace for any good
imaginable, as well as countless forms of business analytics software. And last but not least,
Apple has grown so prevalent that iPhones, iPads, and MacBooks have become synonymous
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with the awe inspiring technological innovation seen in the past 40 years.
However, there are threats associated with these companies. One of the most prominent was the immense social power these companies quietly gained that boiled over with
the silencing of the President of the United States online in early 2021. In the more theoretical investigations, mainstream economists have begun investigating the structure of
two-sided markets with network effects to understand digital markets. These investigations
have yielded intriguing results. However, as much as mainstream economics begins to show
that digital markets may be inherently tending towards concentration, antitrust agencies still
seek to “boost competition”. Although economic theory has long supported competition as
a panacea, in digital markets, where utility is positively correlated with size, this may no
longer be a long-term solution. Breaking up firms such as the “Big Four” may just push
the concentration down the road, instead of restructuring the economic conditions so that
concentration does not arise.
Instead, in our digital world, a different role is needed from governments. Although antitrust is one tool (such as a way to limit anti-competitive size or mergers), governments
need to design new policies and agencies which focus specifically on regulating and shaping
digital markets to protect society from the worst potential costs. This role for competition
policy is not a new one: institutionalist economists who pushed for the passing of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and the FTC Act held similar views. For them, the economy and
social interactions were two sides of the same coin. If the economy would influence social
interactions, there would necessarily be an economic impact from social changes. While
sometimes it is reasonable to allow market dynamics to play out, this interconnection means
that governments have a unique role to help shape society.
One potential policy change is the development of a designated digital market regulator,
similar to the FCC’s role for communications. By removing the analysis of this complicated
and unique type of market from the broadly focused FTC and DOJ, this new regulator can
have more experts on digital markets on staff. This is not a novel idea in and of itself, as
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the Stigler Center (2019) report makes a similar proposal, but the extent and breadth of
viewpoints I argue this regulator must have is novel. This regulator must employ not only
economists to investigate the impacts of the behavior of these firms, but also needs computer
systems experts, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and consumer advocates. The
computer systems experts will allow this regulatory body to properly audit the algorithms
and data collection methods of these companies with an eye towards the economic impact.
The social scientists will help to understand the social benefits of the goods provided by these
companies, as this regulator will not easily be able to determine welfare through economic
indicators alone. The consumer advocates will offer the regulator the perspective of the
consumers it seeks to protect. These advocates can also direct the regulator to areas of
consumer concern. Through this the regulator can determine the costs and benefits of these
companies and develop regulatory actions to reign in actions that hurt society. They can
also push companies to offer users subsidies, which can result in Pareto improvements in
welfare. Even so, this regulator will also need to have proper constraints on power, so as to
limit regulatory capture and abuse of power.
However, the development of a completely new governmental regulatory body is time intensive and politically difficult process, especially in our current political climate. Thus, we
need some immediate options as well so that these companies do not develop enough political
and social power to negate any future regulation. One immediate option is to continue elaborating on the costs of allowing concentration in these markets. This process will influence
how individuals interact with these companies, increasing their hesitancy to interact. It is
true that companies like Google and Meta have immense power over the information that
people see, but this power is not an impenetrable wall. Even small sustained actions can
push some consumers away from these companies or make them more vocal regarding the
economic power of these companies. This can either decrease the power of the companies
or push the trend of institutional change in more socially beneficial directions. Moreover,
growing discontent with the actions of digital companies can force companies to acquiesce
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to demands, lest they are completely destroyed. Nonetheless, these immediate actions are
solely a stopgap procedure. Since governments are a conglomeration of social power, they
are uniquely situated to influence social institutions and are necessary for counteracting the
growing power of digital companies. Without major governmental action, the structure of
the market will remain unchanged and the tendencies of digital markets will inevitably lead
to trust-like technology companies in the future (whether any of these future companies will
be one of the current “Big Four” is anyone’s guess).
Any understanding of digital markets requires knowledge of the market and how economic
interactions take place. This knowledge includes the institutional impact of social norms on
prices of Apple products, how Google’s major share of the search engine market can influence
consumer preferences, and how concentration in digital markets can cause concentration in
other markets. Market power in digital markets should also be seen as power over institutions,
and therefore consumer behavior. This institutional power is a type of market power beyond
just that over other producers, as it impacts consumer preferences as well. I also argue that
there is a unique issue at play in digital markets. These markets are a combination of network
effects and negligible marginal costs that materializes into extremely concentrated markets.
Due to the low marginal costs and common usage of zero prices, mainstream antitrust
standards have limited applicability. To counter the lack of applicability of mainstream
standards for antitrust action (such as consumer welfare and the SSNIP test), knowledge of
the many social costs can offer justification for welfare loss and therefore antitrust action.
Nevertheless, this analysis could be expanded by further investigation of the impact of
non-positive prices on consumer and firm behavior in marketplaces. Economic models of
markets that are owned by a participant in the market are also an area of study which
has untapped potential. Beyond solely economic theories, greater interdisciplinary work
in economics, especially in policy design, can help to develop the policies needed to face to
changing world we see today. Moreover, further economic research which seeks to incorporate
broad social impacts (such as threats to democracy, privacy, etc) into a consumer welfare
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analysis, could allow for a unique synthesis of this approach and the mainstream consumer
welfare model.
It is true that this analysis has deviated from investigating consumer welfare in the strict
economic sense because it includes factors beyond solely prices and income of the consumers.
However, the consumer welfare standard implicitly assumes that consumer preferences do
not change due to social interactions. Furthermore, it assumes that consumer preferences are
given a priori, which raises the major question: what is before one’s interaction with society?
A proper institutional understanding requires one to understand all consumer preferences
are conditioned on and influenced by the society in which they live. This necessarily means
that our actors are no longer acting as mainstream economic theory assumes they do (i.e.,
rational with exogenous preferences). Instead, a broader conception of consumer welfare
is warranted when consumer preferences are understood to be constantly in flux. Since
consumer preferences are ever-changing and those changes are influenced by the society
around consumers, impacts on society should be incorporated into considerations regarding
antitrust action.
The history of antitrust law began with institutional economics. These economists argued
that the size of firms was worrisome not only due to the economic effects, but also the social
ramifications. In order to properly analyze these social impacts, they had to investigate
social costs extensively. However, as the 20th century progressed, antitrust economics drifted
away from its socially conscious origins towards a neoclassical economic focus. This view
assumes that most markets’ natural tendency is to have competition, while I have shown
digital markets have unique characteristics that make monopoly the natural tendency. Thus,
for economics to offer useful theories and prescriptions for our future with digital markets,
it must innovate in its understanding of how markets behave.
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